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The world around, many governments try to use the state and the 
legal order radically to change the character of their economies -
in Eastern Europe and in China, from centrally planned to more 
or less market economies; in much of the Third World, from 
dependent colonial to independent economies; in South Africa, from 
an apartheid-soaked to a color-blind system. Economists and lawyers 
engaged in designing the transformatory legislation demanded by 
these projects divide on several theoretical issues: 
(1). Neo-classical economists3 and orthodox Law and 
Economics scholars4 basically treat a society's economic and 
other institutions as a black box; institutional economists and 
many drafters instead identify institutions as the principal 
variable in economic analysis. 5 
(2) . If institutions have no relevance to market behaviors, 
then it makes sense to repeal every law that structures 
institutions, and permit actors to behave in accordance with 
their marginal utilities. That notion underpinned the "big bang" 
theory of transformation from a centrally-planned to a market 
economy. (The Eastern European countries have mainly followed 
this strategy. 6 ) If, however, institutions significantly define 
market behaviors, a sensible strategy for change consists of 
carefully restructuring each of the manifold institutions within 
1 Clark University and Boston University School of Law. 
2 Boston University School of Law 
3 Samuelson 
4 Psoner? 
5 Samuels? Tool? 
6 
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which market behavior nestles . 
(3) The claim that institutions constitute a black box rests 
on the assertion that all markets work in basically the same 
way. Some scholars infer from that that markets everywhere can 
use the same laws as their framework. That leads to the 
conclusions that one country looking to create a market economy 
can readily copy the laws of another, notionally "successful" 
market economy. In opposition, others assert that law addresses 
repetitive patterns of behaviors, that is, institutions. Since 
time-and-place- specific factors shape those behaviors, a law 
that induces one sort of behavior in a particular time and place 
will onbly serindiptously induce the same behavior in a differen 
time or place. 
(4). Resonating with classical philosophical positivism, 
neo-classical economists and their Law and Economics analogues 
hold that facts and values occupy discontinuous spheres. It 
follows that values are non-commensurable. That leads to a 
theory that holds that legislative outcomes depend entirely upon 
the power of affected interest groups. That perspective instructs 
a drafter to find out what relevant interest groups demand, and 
to write a law that responds to their respective power vectors . 
An alternative view rejects the assumption of a chasm between 
facts and values. That view holds the potential for generating 
legislation grounded not merely on power, but on reason informed 
by experience . 
This paper reports on a project for drafting 22 priority laws in 
connection with transforming the Chinese economy from a centrally-
planned to what the Chinese denote as a 'socialist market 
economy'. That project provides some data that may shed some 
light on these debates. 
In recent decades, China's experience seemed different than that 
in most of the rest of the socialist and the developing worlds. As 
the 20th century waned, most third world development programs lay 
in shambles. Real per capita incomes declined. Poverty deepened. 
In Eastern Europe, the countries that formerly comprised the USSR 
struggled to transform their economies. In practically all of 
these countries, instead of moving into a new era of plenty, the 
incomes and quality of life of most of their people slid towards 
the abyss. 
In the mid-1980s, by contrast, the World Bank7 reported, 
11 China's past strategy and present system have created, on the 
whole, an extraordinarily equal society." Others pointed out, 
China has had one of the world's highest sustained rates of 
World Bank, 1985. China-- Long Term Development Issues and 
Options: A World Bank Country Economic Report. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Univ. P . , p. 29. 
3 
industrial growth during the past thirty-five years. It has 
broadened its industrial base to encompass an increasingly full 
range of production, and it has expanded its industrial 
employment to provide 63 million jobs, equal to the industrial 
employment in all of North America and Western Europe. China has 
do ne this while being isolated from the rest of the world for 
long periods and while undergoing frequent and often radical 
changes in the organization of industry. Since the 1950s, it has 
continually adapted the Soviet central-planning model to develop 
unique forms of organization, such as locally controlled small-
scale industry, in line with the strategy of 'walking on two 
legs' 8 
By the miserable standard of most of the third world, China did 
well. A substantial minority of Chinese, especially in the rural 
areas, remained poor. Most people, however, enjoyed higher real 
living standards than other low-income countries. Agricultural 
collectivization had prevented the emergence of an impoverished 
class of landless laborers. The state guaranteed the minimum 
necessary food supply. Primary school enrollment was high. Most 
people had access to basic medical care and family services. In 
1985, life expectancy, "probably the best single indicator of the 
extent of real poverty," averaged 67 years -- well above the Third 
World median. 9 
The situation in the early 1980s led China's governors to move 
towards a new legal order. China had its own difficulties, 
especially, a mixed bag of technologies: Perhaps 5%, late 20th 
century (mainly in the military and military production) ; about 
half, a decade or more out of date; the rest, far behind the first 
world. China fed 22% of the world's population on 7% of its arable 
soil, but to do so employed 80% of its population (By contrast, 
about 2% of the United States's population not only fed their own 
population, but produced substantial food surpluses for export.) 
China's government concluded that, to accelerate economic growth, 
it must introduce fundamental economic reforms and open its economy 
to the outside world. Their new strategy produced some remarkable 
successes. As the decade of the 1990s began, the World Bank 
8 Tidrick, Gene, and Chen Jiynan. 1987. China's Industrial 
Reform. New York: Oxford University Press, p. ix; see also World 
Bank, 1985. China -- Long Term Development Issues and Options: A 
World Bank Country Economic Report. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. 
P. p. 110. 
9 World Bank, 1985. China -- Long Term Development Issues 
and Options: A World Bank Country Economic Report. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Univ. P .. 
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suggested that China might become another Asian miracle. 1 0 
To accomplish their new program required massive institutional 
changes in practically every aspect of China's economic system. 
Those institutional changes required massive changes in the legal 
order. This paper reports on a five-year, United Nations 
Development Programme-financed project to assist in drafting 22 
priority laws, and in the course of that effort, to improve the 
capacity of Chinese drafters . 11 The paper first describes the 
difficulties that led to China's request for assistance, primarily 
delays in drafting bills and laws that failed to accomplish their 
purpose. Second, it analyzes the causes of those difficulties: 
principally, the drafters' inappropriate conceptualizations of 
their task; their lack of knowledge about foreign law and 
experience, especially how to use it in drafting Chinese 
legislation; the inadequacy of their social science research 
skills; and their insufficient knowledge of drafting techniques. 
Third, it describes the project's proposed solution: Grounded in an 
adequate theory of legislation, to train Chinese drafters by 
engaging them in completing the 22 priority bills. Finally, it 
concludes with some observations about the project's lessons for 
the use of law to facilitate development. 
I. THE DIFFICULTY THAT EXCITED THE PROJECT 
This section outlines, first, how China's perceived need for new 
legislation implied a need for institutional transformation; 
second, the organizational steps that prior to the UNDP project the 
Chinese government had already taken to meet that need; and third, 
the deficiencies in the existing drafting system. 
A. THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMED INSTITUTIONS AND MORE LEGISLATION 
As China began to restructure institutions to implement the 
Reforms and Open Policy, its leaders recognised the necessity to 
create a new legal order appropriate for a market economy. This 
section first outlines the considerations that persuaded to the 
Chinese that China needed new legislation, and, second, how the 
demand for new legislation implied a demand for new institutions, 
i.e., for new behaviors by a range of social actors. 
1. China's need for new laws. In 1979, China's new governors 
proclaimed a programme aimed at transforming the national economy 
from a centrally planned one to a 'socialist market economy' . 1 2 
10 World Bank, East Asian Miracle Economic Growth and 
Public Policy (Oxford University Press, 1993) 
11 We served as Chief Technical Advisors to the project from 
its inception. This paper rests on our personal experience in 
connection with the project. 
1 2 [documents etc.] During first three years of the UNDP/BLA 
project, the very definition of the kind of market economy the 
government proposed remained subject to debate. At first, 
government officials frequently used the term 'planned commodity 
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They largely de-collectivized agriculture. 13 Increasingly, they 
sought to submit investment decisions in all sectors of the economy 
to the guidance of market forces. 14 At the same time, they tried 
to end the three decades of international isolation imposed after 
the 1949 revolution by external factors and government policies. 15 
To reap the benefits of the knowledge and advanced technologies 
developed elsewhere, their , open door, policy aimed to attract 
foreign private investment, managerial skills, , know how, and 
access to international markets. 16 By the late 1 80s, they realized 
the need for appropriate legislation, not only to articulate 
relations within the planned sector and between the planned and the 
market sectors, but also to ensure orderly, equitable development 
of the institutions that shaped its emerging markets. Today, 
nobody doubts that markets cannot exist without a legal structure. 
Investors need laws to ensure the stability and predictability they 
need to risk their capital. 17 These include two sorts of laws: 
The laws sometimes called ,private, law (principally, contract and 
property law in all their multitudinous varieties), and the laws 
that structure the institutions that supply market actors with 
opportunities, capacities and interest to participate in the market 
(banks, a skilled work force, adequate transportation, a reasonable 
infrastructure, a functioning government, for farmers, an 
agricultural extension service, and so forth) . 18 These rules take 
many different forms; the sorts chosen helps to define the sort of 
market economy., By 1994, most referred to a ,socialist market 
economy, and sometimes just to a ,market economy., In the course 
of the project, it became clear that the 22 priority laws the 
participants drafted would contribute to defining the kind of 
market economy introduced. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Max Weber. 194 7 . The Theory of Social and Economic 
Oroanization. Tr. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; ed. Talcott 
Parsons. New York: The Free Press; 1978. Economy and 
Society. G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. Berkeley: University of 
California Press 
18 Posner, Richard A. , The Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: 
Little, Brown, 3rd ed., 1986; Weber, Max. Economy and Society. G. 
Roth and C. Wittich, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978; and Max Weber, ed. The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization. Tr. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. NY: The 
Free Press, 1947. 
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market that exists in any given country. 
To induce social actors to behave in new ways to improve the 
interactions between market units and within firms, China's 
government, like those elsewhere , had no alternative but to invoke 
the machinery of the law. 19 To solve its manifold problems of 
management and administrative performance it required new 
administrative law; 20 to avoid environmental disasters it must 
enact appropriate environmental laws; 21 to increase the role of 
women in development it must introduce new laws to improve their 
opportunities and capacities to participate in the economy. 22 
By the late 20th century, throughout most of the world, 
legislation and administrative regulations had become the only 
legitimate source of new rules. 23 To transform existing 
institutions in order to implement the Reforms, China's law-makers, 
1 9 [See authors in Hungarian book on L&modernization] ; cf. 
Skocpol, Theda, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies in Current 
Research", in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, 
Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge U. P., 1985). For 
critique, see Gabriel A. Almond, "The Return of the State". 82 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 853-74 (1988) and replies by Eric A. Nordinger, 
Theodore J . Lowi and Sergio Fabbrini, pp. 875-901 . 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 In the 19th Century, in England, then the most powerful 
of the emerging capitalist countries of Europe, historical 
circumstances endowed courts with broad powers to interpret those 
rights and duties. They principally exercised those powers in the 
context of litigation between private parties. This helped to 
generate the analytical positivist myth that, far from shaping 
markets to facilitate the development process, laws can at most 
define bargaining parties' rights and duties. See below, text at 
n. XX. 
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too, had to redraft old laws and write new ones . 
China's legal history differed from that of most other third 
world countries . At independence, those countries made only 
marginal changes in their inherited legal system; almost 
invariably, these proved inadequate to foster development. 24 In 
contrast, in 1949, almost uniquely, China's revolutionary 
government declared invalid t he entire corpus of its received 
(Kuomintang) legal legacy. 25 Its leaders tended to govern through 
administrative decrees rather than formally-adopted statutes. 26 
During the decade of the Cultural Revolution, university law 
departments closed, reopening again only in 1986. 2 7 As a result, 
China entered the 1980s Reform period with a legal order frequently 
characterized by arbitrary administrative decision-making. Its 
law-makers had little knowledge or capacity for drafting new 
legislation to induce social actors to behave in orderly, 
predictable ways. The government did enact some new laws, 28 but a 
vast amount of legislation basic to any market economy, socialist 
24 See Seidmans, State and Law in the Development Process, 
op. cit. Chs. 2, 8. 
25 
26 
27 
28 These included a patent law (cite), a copyright law, (cite) 
three foreign investment laws (cite) , a bankruptcy law (cite) , a 
state enterprise law (cite), and others. Training programs 
provided opportunities for advanced study (frequently overseas) for 
high-level personnel . The authorities invited foreign experts to 
advise them on administrative, banking, foreign trade, and other 
legislation. 
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or otherwise, remained absent or inadequate: banking law, 
corporation law, domestic investment law, foreign trade law, budget 
law, and a gaggle more. 
Held together by various sorts of normative instruments, the 
existing social practices relating to the economy lacked four 
characteristics a legal system requires to underpin a market: rules 
that --
(1) emerge from the society's legitimate, deliberative law-making 
system; 
( 2) the state promulgates publicly, so that relevant market 
actors know of their own and others' expected behaviors; 
(3) have a logical internal consistency, so that market actors 
can obey them; and 
(4) have as much precision as possible, both to advise social 
actors of the likely consequences of their own and others' 
behaviors; and to limit officials' discretion. 29 
2. The nexus between laws and institutions. That China required 
new laws reflected its felt need for new institutions appropriate 
to its developmental goals. By definition, "institution" means 
patterns of repetitive behaviours by various actors. 30 
Every proposal for change through law proposes changing an 
institution. All law prescribes repetitive patterns of behavior 
for its addressees. In this sense, however incrementally, new law 
always prescribes institutional change. When China's 1990 Five 
Year Plan called for a new banking law, a new education law, a new 
29 Lon Fuller? Other? Cf. Luhmann on the specificity of law 
(from Ed Rubin) 
30 Homans, George Casper. The Nature of Social Science. 
N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. 
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budget law, and new drafting regulations, it called for new social 
behaviours of the actors who comprised its banking, educatioal, 
budget and drafting institutions . To draft these new laws , China's 
drafters had to become experts in changing those social behaviors. 
Most capitalist countries' institutional structures and their 
associated legal orders acquired their market-oriented cast 
incrementally over centuries. 31 China needed a whole bookcase of 
new laws, and a whole forest of new institutions -- immediately . 
Its law-makers had to design whole new legislative programs -- that 
is, whole gaggles of new institutions -- instanter. 
That China required new laws reflected its felt need for new 
institutions appropriate to its developmental goals. By definition, 
"institution" means patterns of repetitive behaviours by various 
actors. 32 
Every proposal for change through law proposes changing an 
institution. All law prescribes r epetitive patterns of behavior 
for its addressees. In this sense, however incrementally, new law 
always prescribes institutional change. 33 When China's 1990 Five 
31 Horowitz 
32 Homans, George Casper. The Nature of Social Science. 
N.Y. : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. 
33 Whatever classical economics's claim to treat institutions 
as a black box, to the extent that they purport to offer advice 
about legislation, even practitioners of its legal offspring, law 
and economics, cannot avoid considering institutional causes of 
role occupant behavior. Even considering incentive structur es 
requires looking at the law and the institutions that structure 
those incentives. In fact , in its policy- and law- making modes, 
law and economics does look carefully at the institutions that 
structure the market, sometimes while denying that they do so. Cf. 
Stokey and Zeckhauser, (All social problems constitute 
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Year Plan called for a new banking law, a new education law, a new 
budget law, and new drafting regulations, it called for new social 
behaviours of the actors who comprised its banking, educational, 
budget and drafting institutions. To draft these new laws, China's 
drafters had to become experts in changing those social behaviors. 
Initially, the Chinese drafting system proved incapable of 
meeting so formidable a challenge. Most visibly, it failed to 
produce laws promptly. By 1991, no matter how brief or narrow a 
regulation's scope, from the date of its assignment to the drafters 
to its appearance as a bill took, on average, about a year; 
enactment of a law, two years. From conception to enactment, 
large, important, or contentious bills took much longer: eleven 
years for the copyright law; eight years for the Bankruptcy Act; 
thirty years for the Maritime Regulations (and still counting) By 
1991, at the inception of the UNDP/BLA project, almost all the 
specified 22 bills and regulations had gestated for years, many for 
a decade and more. China's leaders searched for solutions. 
B. CHANGES IN BILL- CREJ!,TING INSTITUTIONS 
By the end of the 1980s, China's new leaders had already taken 
important strides in reforming the country's administrative 
market failures; market failures result from failures of 
information, factor mobility, adequate incentives, sufficient 
numbers of market players to avoid monopoly, and the other 
requirements of a perfectly free, perfectly competitive market). 
Although Stokey and Zeckhauser never denote these as 
institutions, plainly these market failures consist not merely of 
resource allocation failures, but also of failure of the 
institutions that supply information, permit factors more or less 
mobility, supply incentives, permit entry into markets, predatory 
behavior by market actors, and so forth.) 
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and legal systems. They changed the constitution; they enacted 
some laws relating to the market economy; and they restructured the 
institutions that created law. 
1. Constitutional changes. At least on paper, the new 1982 
Constitution34 established the supremacy of law. By 1991, when we 
began to work on the project here described, formally the law-
making power descended from the National People's Congress (see 
Figure 1) . 
Figure 1: CHINA'S LAW-MAKING SYSTEM, 1990 
National Peoples' 
Congress (NPC) 
State Council 
(elected) Bureau of Ministries 
Departments Legislative 
NPC's Standing Affairs (BLA) of Legislative 
Committee 
Provincial Peoples' 
Congresses (PPCs) 
Local government 
councils 
Provincial 
BLAs 
Local BLAs 
Drafting (DLAs) 
The National People's Congress (NPC) exercised the general 
legislative power. Article 67 of the Constitution endowed the 
NPC's Standing Committee with certain law-making powers. The State 
Council, 35 whose constituent agencies include the national 
government ministries and major departments, constituted the 
highest administrative structure. The Constitution [Article 89(1)] 
empowered the State Council to 11 enact administrative ... 
34 
35 The State Council serves essentially the same function as 
does the Cabinet in other governments. 
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regulations" . Within their respective jurisdictions, as empowered 
by relevant statutes, the Ministries and Commissions may issue 
orders, directives and rules. (Article 90). The People's Congresses 
and Standing Committees of local provinces and cities directly 
under the Central Government "may adopt local regulations which 
must not contravene the Constitution, the statutes and the 
administrative rules and regulations .... " (Article 100) . Lower 
level congresses may "issue decisions and orders" (Article 107) . 
The NPC's Standing Committee has the power [Article 67(7), (8)] to 
annul lower organs' regulations or laws if they contravened the 
Constitution or applicable law. 
2. Institutional changes: Creating the BLA and the DLAs. 36 
China's leaders also improved the nation's legislative drafting 
capacity, especially by creating and progressively strengthening 
the Bureau of Legislative Affairs (BLA) . Between May 1980 and 
July, 1981, the State Council set up a Bureau of Law and Legal 
Institutions under the General Office of the State Council, and an 
Economic Legislation Research Center. In 1986, it amalgamated these 
to form the BLA. By 1990, the national BLA employed 260 personnel, 
including 164 legislative drafters. 37 It had loosely affiliated 
branch offices in every province and even cities that assisted and 
36 Factual material in this section based on interviews with 
BLA officials, 1991. 
37 About two thirds constitute professional staff 
drafters, researchers and administrators. The remaining one third 
constitute support staff. 
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supervised local law-making and law-implementing activities. 38 
In addition, by the 1990s, every central government ministry and 
department had established a Department of Legal Affairs (DLA) to 
draft laws and regulations to implement its policies and programs. 
Averaging about twenty members in each, all told the national DLAs 
employed about 1200 professionals. 
3. The tasks of the BLA and the DLAs. The BLA had two principal 
tasks. With the assistance of the DLAs, it bore the laboring oar 
in drafting the legal blueprints for re-shaping the institutions 
required to implement the Reforms. Implicitly, it also had the 
principal responsibility to draft bills likely to further the Rule 
of Law. 
a. Institutional reform through the legal order . Early in the 
Reforms, the National People's Congress delegated to the 
State Council the power to enact draft regulations concerning taxes 
and all matters 11 Concerning the reform of the economic structure 
and the open policy 11 • The State Council delegated to the BLA most 
of the tasks related to the exercise of these powers, and relied 
heavily upon the BLA's advice. By 1991, BLA had the following 
powers 39 : 
+ To draft the legislation program of the State Council; 
38 Provincial and local BLAs had an important function of 
informing ,provinces and localities about the requirements of new 
laws . They served provincial state councils in a way analogous to 
the relationship between BLA and the State Council at the national 
level. 
39 11 The Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council of 
the People ' s Republic of China, 11 Beijing, 1987 [in English and 
Chinese] pp . 5-7. 
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+ To coordinate all the legislative work of the DLAs, that is, 
of the State Council's constituent agencies; 
+ To review and clear draft laws, treaties, agreements and 
administrative regulations prepared and proposed by DLAs. 
+ To draft important laws and regulations, especially those that 
involve the responsibility of a number of State Council units; 
+ To interpret administrative regulations; 
+ To codify promulgated regulations; 
+ To oversee the application of economic and administrative laws 
and regulations; 
+ To study the needs and issues that affect the legal base of 
China and advance recommendations on these matters to the State 
Council; 
+ To continuously examine the validity and applicability of laws 
and regulations; 
+ To compile all locally passed regulations and rules, to review 
them, and to codify and record them; 
+ To conduct academic exchanges and consultations with both 
domestic and foreign legal entities and circles; 
+To familiarize itself with the legal systems and theories of 
other countries; 
In cooperation with the BLA, each DLA had to carry out three more 
specialized tasks: 
+ to work out legislative plans for its ministry, including 
bills, regulations and rules; 
+ to review and where necessary rewrite the laymen's drafts 
prepared by another ministerial department; and 
+ to draft bills, regulations and rules for its ministry. 
These tasks implicitly made the BLA the guardian of the rule of 
law. 
b . Guarding the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law has diverse 
aspects. Among others, the canon of valid law must remain free of 
15 
internal contradictions; it must be cognoscible, that is, 
accessible to ordinary citizens; and it must actually induce the 
behaviors prescribed (for if laws consistently do not bring about 
the behaviors they prescribe, government rapidly loses 
legitimacy) . 40 BLA's obligations to codify promulgated 
regulations, and to nstudy the needs and issues that affect the 
legal base of Chinan dealt with these aspects of the Rule of Law. 
Even without explicit directions, however, BLA's responsibility 
for protecting the Rule of Law ineluctably emerged from its role as 
central drafter. As Britain's central drafting office discovered 
many decades earlier, by assuming the responsibility for drafting 
all laws, it inevitably undertook to keep them consistent with 
each other. It had to ensure that the laws not only avoided crass 
contradictions, but that they retained an internal logic. 
Britain's office of Parliamentary Counsel became de facto the 
Office for the Protection of the Rule of Law. 41 In China the BLA 
assumed the same responsibilities. 
4. The drafting process. Having established the BLA as its new 
legislative drafting institution, China's reformers assumed that it 
and its associated DLAs would draft priority legislation. To do 
that, they had to resolve manifold policy dilemmas. In this 
respect, China implicitly rejected the British and American myth 
that drafters concerned themselves, not with a bill's substance, 
40 Robert B. Seidman, nnrafting for the Rule of Lawn ... . 
41 W. J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman, Law, Order and Power 
(2d ed.); R. B. Seidman, nLeg drafting in African. 
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but only its form. In that myth, only legislators made policy 
decisions. 42 In China, the National People's Congress has always 
approved bills submitted to it by its Standing Committee. 43 Only 
very rarely did the Standing Committee and the State Council 
disapprove of a draft submitted by the BLA. Furthermore, the 
drafters' nominal political superiors give them few instructions, 
typically only identifying the difficulty the proposed law should 
address. 
In practice, therefore, China's drafters explicitly had to deal, 
not merely with issues of form, but issues of substance. 44 In 
addition, China's drafters often had to resolve disputes over turf, 
interest group debates, conflicting ministerial missions --all the 
42 See .... That this constitutes a myth, see. 
43 This is typical of Parliamentary systems everywhere, and 
almost all presidential systems as well. In only a few countries, 
in which individual legislators have their own political base, will 
legislator-politicians meaningfully dissent from a Cabinet that 
invariably contains the Party leaders. See .. 
44 In the world of practice rather than myth, in every system 
the civil service (including the legislative drafters) resolves 
substantive issues. For example, in the British drafting process, 
ministerial civil servants devise the legislative program, embodied 
in a memorandum, or sometimes in a 'layman's draft' of the bill. 
After approval by the Cabinet Committee on Legislation, that goes 
to the drafters. Inevitably, the drafters must devise the details 
for inclusion in the final bill. That goes back to the civil 
servants for review, and for comment by 'interested parties' 
selected by the civil servants. Although the British and Chinese 
adopted different notions of what the word 'drafting' subsumes, in 
practice their respective systems constitute functional 
equivalents. The explanation in each case seems also the same: as 
in China, so in Britain. In each case, the parliamentary system 
guarantees a built-in automatic government majority. Except in 
very rare instances in Britain, government bills come to Parliament 
with an assurance of enactment. Before arriving there, the bill's 
authors must have resolved issues of substance and conflicts of 
power and interest. See .... 
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contradictions that in other systems legislators and ministers 
notionally resolved. 
For complex bills like those in the UNDP/BLA project, China's 
drafting process encompassed nine steps45 : 
Step 1. BLA personnel meet with ministry officials and people 
from important relevant government agencies and occasionally from 
organized interest groups (for example, in the case of labor law, 
the trade union organization) to work out the legislative 
programme. 
Step 2. BLA identifies drafting group members. In a bill 
originating in BLA, some of these will come from BLA, and others 
from relevant DLAs. 
Step 3. The drafting group formulates an outline for the draft. 
Step 4. The drafting group drafts the bill. 
Step 5. Several group meetings examine the initial draft. The 
group has discretion as to whom to invite to these meetings. 
Usually, if the matter of the draft touches some organizational 
interest, the group will invite that organization to send a 
representative; if many government and non-government 
organizations have an interest, the drafting group decides whom 
to invite. 
Step 6. After revision in light of the criticism by the affected 
organizations, the group sends the draft back to the ministry for 
review and approval. The group leader explains the bill at a 
meeting within the ministry. 
Step 7. After ministerial approval, the ministry sends to the 
State Council the draft and the statement of reasons; the State 
Council forwards it to BLA, which reviews the draft both 
technically and in light of national strategies. It also sends 
copies to those whom BLA identifies as interested people. Their 
critiques sometimes reveal major unresolved problems. To invite 
comments on an important bill, BLA, at its own discretion, may 
publish it. 
45 Less complex bills usually arose 1n a single ministry. 
After a first draft by the ministerial DLA, the ministry 
forwarded it to the State Council. The State Council; 
immediately referred it to BLA, which then undertook the same 
review as it undertook in the more complex process mentioned in 
the text. 
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Step 8. The group then revises the draft to meet those 
comments. If it cannot reach consensus, the group usually 
defers decision; if they can, they forward the draft to BLA. 
Step 9. A group of senior BLA drafters reviews the revised draft. 
If they approve, they prepare a statement of reasons justifying 
the draft, and forward it the State Council. If they disapprove 
(for example, because the draft grants the ministry powers that 
exceed the ministry's authority), they may either return the 
draft to the drafting group requesting revision, or they may 
forward the draft to the State Council recommending rejection. 46 
5. Preparing to draft priority legislation. The Eighth Five 
Year Plan (1989) identified the 22 priority bills whose drafting 
formed the core of the UNDP /BLA project. 47 The BLA appointed high-
and lower-ranking officials and drafters from the relevant DLAs and 
BLA to nine task groups. Each task group focused on a priority 
legislative area: Macro-economic control; enterprise; market; 
agriculture; foreign trade; environment and resources; education; 
legislative techniques. The ninth group, the liaison group, 
coordinated the efforts of the others with the BLA' s overall 
activities. 
Each task group inherited a substantial body of research findings 
gathered earlier by relevant ministries or one or more of China's 
numerous research institutes. Some initiated further research; all 
proceeded to formulate preliminary draft bills. 
These changes in the institutions and processes of bill-creation, 
however, also encountered difficulties. 
46 Provincial and local governments must also submit drafts of 
bills or regulations to BLA for review. 
47 In fact, after consul tat ions with 
proposed the 22 bills for inclusion in the 
the ministries, 
five year plan. 
BLA 
19 
C. DEFICIENCIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING INSTITUTIONS. 
In the summer of 1991, at the request of the BLA48 , we served as 
a UNDP mission to review a draft proposal for UNDP assistance in 
the drafting process. We met for a day with each of the drafting 
teams BLA had created -- in effect, focus groups. 49 We structured 
the group discussions around a problem-solving agenda: the nature 
of the problems the drafting teams had encountered in drafting 
their bills; their initial explanations for them; and the steps 
they considered necessary to overcome them. 
Those discussions identified identified four serious deficiencies 
in China's drafting system: inordinate delays limited the quantity 
of bills drafted; the laws enacted too often failed to induce the 
prescribed behaviors; some had unintended, perverse consequences; 
and the emerging legal framework lacked coherence and 
cognoscibility. 
1. Quantity. Especially at the beginning of the Reforms, 
China's law-makers commonly enacted laws based on administrative 
regulations previously enacted by the State Council and implemented 
for a period of time on an experimental basis. 50 In the decade 
48 In 1989-90, as Fulbright Professors, we had taught at 
Peking University. In the course of our year there, we had given 
a four-day series of lectures to a course in legislative drafting 
then run by BLA, in which we taught the legislative theory 
discussed below. 
49 See, eg., David L. Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative 
Research (London: Sage Publications, 1988). 
50 This provided useful experimentation, but also perpetuated 
contradictory practices and arbitrary decision-making. These 
fostered unpredictability and instability, threatening market 
growth. For example, government gave the island of Hainan (pop. 
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after 1979, the NPC and its Standing Committee adopted 80 laws, 
i.e., only eight per year. The State Council adopted five times 
as many regulations, but, for China's 125 or so ministries and 
departments, governing almost a quarter of the world's population, 
those totalled only 40 per year. Provincial and local governments, 
too, proved incapable of enacting the local ordinances and 
regulations required to implement the Reforms. The enactment of 
important legislation took many years: eleven years for the 
copyright law; eight years for the Bankruptcy Act; thirty years for 
the Maritime Regulations (and still counting) . By 1991, at the 
inception of the UNDP/BLA project, almost all the specified 22 
bills and regulations had gestated for years, many for a decade and 
more. In a period of forced-draft institutional reforms, this 
legislative output seemed paltry. 
2. Inducing prescribed behavior. As in other countries, China's 
new laws and regulations did not always induce the behaviors they 
prescribed. Two examples: (1) The ordinary stroller in Beijing, 
one of the cities with the most air pollution in the world, might 
learn with some surprise that China had enacted an air pollution 
control statute. 51 (2) In the 1980s, in response to inflationary 
tendencies, year after year China's political leaders directed 
banks to reduce loans for undesirable capital expenditures; year 
6,000,000) almost complete freedom from national economic laws. 
It became a free-booter's paradise, a major source for smuggled 
goods and a serious leak for fore i gn exchange. 
51 
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after year those expenditures rose. 52 3 . Perverse 
consequences. Some of China's new laws had perverse consequences. 
For example, to stimulate enterprise vitality, the Government 
introduced a two-tier pricing system, giving farms and enterprises 
the power to sell goods produced over the contract-defined minimum 
at higher-than-plan prices. 53 Not infrequently, enterprise 
managers siphoned off inputs delivered at the planned low price and 
sold them at high market prices for their own account; existing 
rules failed to prevent this corrupt speculation. 54 
4. Coherence and Cognoscibility. For any type of market economy 
to function well, its legal order requires coherence and 
cognoscibility. 55 That calls for precise formulations of laws and 
regulations, as well as codification, indexing and publication. 56 
Not infrequently, Chinese laws contained vague terms, evading the 
substance of that requirement. 57 No place did China's relatively 
few laws and vast number of administrative regulations appear in 
a codified, indexed form. Scattered in innumerable decrees, many 
lost in ministerial files, citizens had little or no possibility, 
before taking action, of discovering their complete contents. Yet, 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
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as Lon Fuller58 emphasized, secret rules do not merit even the 
name of law. 
The UNDP/BLA project aimed to help Chinese drafters resolve these 
four difficulties. In conformity with the problem-solving 
methodology, 59 together with the task groups we further explored 
their causes. 
II 
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PERCEIVED DIFFICULTIES 
Unless a solution addresses a difficulty's causes, too easily it 
will but poultice symptoms. Our discussions with the drafting 
groups indicated several explanations for China's new drafting 
institutions' difficulties: 60 the drafters' misconceived the 
function of law and their corresponding drafting task; they lacked 
appropriate training in legislative theory and methodology; and 
rules purporting to define the drafting process proved inadequate. 
A. MISCONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE DRAFTING TASK 
The drafters offered two inconsistent reasons for their 
difficulties that reflected misconceptions of the role of law and 
their drafting task. Some adopted a crude version of a popular 
Marxist metaphor to describe the relationship between law and 
society: The mode of production, the 'base,' determines the 
58 Fuller, Lon. 1960. Adjudication and the Rule of Law. 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 1. 
59 See below, text at n. xx. 
60 About one, the project plainly could do nothing directly: 
China's budget constraints limited BLA and DLA staff members to a 
number that seemed far too small to draft all the legislation 
required for a quarter of the world's population. 
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superstructure, that is, ideology, religion, institutions, the 
State, civil society, and law. 61 The causality goes only one way: 
law can only mirror social realities. 62 Since rapid change and 
widespread uncertainty characterized China's mode of production 
during the Reforms, some Chinese drafters held that they could not 
draft adequate laws until economic conditions 'settled down.' 
Other drafters expressed a contrary view that resonated with the 
19th Century British analytical positivist notion that a law 
represents the 'command of the sovereign' . 63 That view reflected 
the notions that law's central function consists in guiding courts 
in the resolution of disputes, 64 and that society and especially 
markets function best without state intervention. These Chinese 
drafters concluded, therefore, that laws could only establish 
'rights and duties' to facilitate dispute-settlement. 
Neither view could guide drafters in writing bills likely to 
induce change in either economic or other institutions. The crude 
Marxist version denied that law, as part of the superstructure, 
61 
62 See, e.g. , . A more sophisticated version emphasized 
the dialectical relationship between basis and superstructure, thus 
holding out the possibility of using law (as part of the 
superstructure) to affect the basis. Cf. Engels, Friedrich. 1968. 
Letter to C. Schmidt, 27 October 1890 in Marx, Karl, and Friedrich 
Engels. The Marx-Engels Reader. (2d. ed.); ed. Robert C. Tucker. 
New York: Norton, 1978. 
63 Austin, John. 1954. The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined: and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence. London: 
Widenfeld and Nicolson. [First edition 1834] . 
64 [British J. Soc Law article re: codifications in nineteenth 
century] . 
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could change the behaviours that constituted the basis; the crude 
analytical positivist notion at best told lawyers to ask what 
constituted a just allocation of rights and duties, not what 
behaviours best served the public interest. Both versions denied 
law's role in social engineering, 65 as government's primary means 
for channelling the human behaviors that comprise every 
institution. In the face of massive demands for new laws to 
restructure institutions, these ideologies, combined with their 
relatively weak drafting capacity , tended to immobilize Chinese 
drafters. 
B. THE DRAFTERS' CAPACITIES 
In China, as elsewhere, those responsible for creating bills not 
only had to draft laws in the narrow sense of writing laws in 
acceptable language; they had to design whole legislative programs. 
They needed much more than the relatively narrow linguistic and 
writing techniques that constitute the core of Anglo-American 
drafting instruction. 66 (The Chinese did, of course, need those 
skills too, but expatriates could hardly teach Chinese drafters how 
to write in Chinese 6 7 ) • After briefly describing the Chinese 
65 Pound, Roscoe. Social Control through Law. New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1942. 
66 sEE DRAFTING TEXTS 
6 7 The project did include funds for preparation of a 
handbook on drafting rules and regulations, including rules for 
drafting in Chinese . The project participant assigned to the task 
read as many legislative drafting handbooks in English as he could 
find, and discussed the issues with experts from the US, Denmark 
and England. 
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drafters' formal qualifications, this section considers their level 
of knowledge and skills in three areas: social science research; 
knowledge of relevant foreign law and experience; and, above all, 
legislative theory. 
1. For.mal qualifications. Aside from a brief BLA-run course, no 
BLA or DLA drafter had any formal legislative drafting training. 
Almost all had degrees from universities, where many had majored in 
(typically compartmentalized) social sciences, especially ln 
economics, 68 or in history, the physical sciences, or, after 1986, 
in law. 69 Among 164 BLA drafters, about 40 had graduate degrees 
in various disciplines. Others had upgraded their skills through 
on-the-job experience. Reflecting the general state of China's 
higher education, 70 even the drafters with social science degrees, 
though well-acquainted with their subjects, had not learned much 
about how to utilize social science research findings, far less to 
conduct research to gather evidence to justify their draft 
proposals. 
68 As it did to university law departments, the cultural 
revolution destroyed sociology as a university-taught discipline. 
University departments of sociology have restarted only 
comparatively recently. [Cite?] 
69 With the exception a course at we introduced in Peking 
University in 1988-89 (Professor Lisa Stearns continued it for two 
years thereafter), none of China's newly re-established university 
law departments offered a course on drafting bills. 
70 
"Legal Training and Eduction in the 1990's: An Overview and 
Assessment of China's Needs" by William P. Alford (Harvard) and 
Fang Liufang (China University of Political Science and Law), 
assisted by Lu Zhifang (University of International Business and 
Economics) (World Bank) 
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2. Social science research skills. Law can only exercise its 
social engineering function by changing the repetitive patterns of 
behaviors that comprise institutions. 71 People decide to behave 
as they do in the face of a rule of law by choosing among the 
constraints and resources thrown up by their environments. 7 2 
These include, not only their objective circumstances, but also 
their own subjective interests, values and ideologies. 
captures that proposition . 
Figure 2: 
THE FACTORS SHAPING A ROLE OCCUPANT'S RESPONSE 
TO A LAW 
Rule of law 
Role occupant 
"The arena of choice" -i.e., the 
constraints and resources in the 
role occupant's (country-specific) 
circumstances, or environment. 
Figure 2 
To draft laws likely to change the existing behaviors of their 
addressees ("role occupants" 73 ) calls for evidence concerning the 
71 
Process, 
Seidman and Seidman, State and Law 
op. cit., esp. Chs. 2,6. 
ln the Development 
72 Cf. Frederik Barth, Models of Social Organization. Royal 
Anthropological Institute. Occasional Paper 23. Glasgow: The 
University Press, 1966. Seidman and Seidman, State and Law in the 
Development Process, Ch. 6. 
73 The model uses the term 'role occupant' to denote the 
class of persons who, as addressees of a state-made rule, perform 
a social role. A law's addressees, or role occupants, may therefore 
consist of every member of society ("Thou shalt not commit 
murder") , a defined class of non- officials ("No director of a 
corporation may use insider knowledge for private benefit"), or an 
27 
causes of those behaviors. Capturing that data calls for social 
science research skills. Drafters must know how to use facts to 
warrant explanations of the causal factors that influence social 
actors' behaviors in the face of existing rules. Only then can 
they draft bills likely to alter or eliminate those causes, thus 
making it more likely the actors will conform with the proposed new 
rule. 74 
For decades, some BLA and DLA staff members had engaged in their 
ministries' research and practical work; they had extensive 
knowledge of the facts of the substantive problems their bills 
addressed. As we discovered during the course of the project, 
however, they had little knowledge about the causes of the 
behaviors that led to those perverse resource allocations. The 
foreign consultant for the underground water bill, for example, 
reported that the drafting team's members seemed able to provide 
detailed information about every cubic meter of underground water 
in China. They had few hypotheses and less evidence, however, as 
to why Chinese peasants or industrial firm personnel overused or 
polluted it, and had few of the skills required to investigate 
those causes. While the study of foreign law and experience 
obviously could not provide evidence relating to China's country-
specific circumstances, it might potentially prove helpful in 
designing the relevant social science research. 
official ("The Public Utilities Commission shall prescribe fair and 
reasonable rules for the generation and distribution of 
electricity"). 
74 Justifying Legislation 
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3. How to use foreign law and experience. As everywhere 1 
Chinese drafters grasped at foreign law as a model for their new 
legal order. Many seemed convinced that someplace 1 0Ut there/ lay 
an /international standard/ for every law relating to education 1 
national parks/ mining 1 whatever: Foreign law and experience would 
provide them a model they could copy. A number of drafters 
explained their difficulties by their lack of knowledge of foreign 
law and experience. 
Reflecting their inadequate comprehension of the relationship 
between law and behaviour and therefore of law and institutions/ 
these drafters misconceived their problem. As Figure 2 suggests/ 
the behaviour induced by any particular law depends not merely upon 
the law/ but also upon the social surround of the law 1 S addressees/ 
including the behaviours of the implementing agency. Copying a 
law or a presumed /international standard 1 could only induce in its 
new home the same behaviours as in its original one if both the 
implementing agency in the new country/ and other factors in the 
social surround of the addressees closely resembled those in the 
law 1 s place of origin. 75 Like those of every other country 1 
China 1 S circumstances/ of course/ are unique. Laws that seem to 
1 Work 1 elsewhere will only serindiptously produce the same results 
in China. The Chinese drafters/ belief that copying foreign law 
or an /international standard/ made their study of foreign law not 
merely useless/ but positively dangerous/ for it led them to draft 
bills which would almost undoubtedly fail to induce their 
75 State 1 Law and Development 
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prescribed behaviours. 
Without an adequate understanding of how law works, the study of 
comparative law can yield little useful knowledge. 76 The UNDP/BLA 
project aimed to equip Chinese drafters with a legislative theory 
to guide their study of foreign law, not to copy it, but to learn 
from the experiences it generated. They also needed that theory to 
guide research into the causes of behaviours in the face of a rule 
of law . 
4 . Lack of an adequate legislative theory. As figure 2 
suggests, whether role occupants will conform to a particular rule 
prescribing their behaviors depends not only upon the ter ms of the 
rule and its prescribed sanctions, but also upon all the other, 
non-legal factors that influence the choices they make in deciding 
how to act . 77 Nobody, however, can do research about all aspects 
of a role occupant's environment; nobody ever has enough research 
resources to examine more than a tiny corner of realty's endless 
mazes. Researchers require a map of the relevant circumstances to 
advise them where to find to fertile fields, and what arid deserts 
to avoid. Theory should provide that guide. 78 
Without an adequate legislative theory to guide their analysis, 
drafters too often give up using reason informed by experience to 
discover explanations for behavior in the face of a law. Instead, 
76 See R.B.Seidman, (Watson book review); 
comparative law. 
77 
Paul Brietzke on 
78 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (theory a net whose mesh 
determines what facts one catches) . 
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they either copy foreign law, or substitute for the real world 
their imagined realities: ideal-typical competitive markets, 79 or 
people with mythical characteristics (innately "conservative" 
peasants, 80 or women who work only for "pin money" 81 and whose 
"innate characteristics" sui ted them for usually low-paid j obs 82 
) . Without a theory, drafters have no way of knowing -- far less 
convincing policy-makers -- that the laws they draft will lead to 
more appropriate behaviors in the unique circumstances of their own 
countries. 
A principal explanation for the Chinese drafting system's 
difficulties lay in the drafters' apparent innocence of any theory 
relating law and behavior: in the deepest sense, their lack of any 
real knowledge about the sociology of law. Without an adequate 
legislative theory, they floundered. The existing drafting rules 
and processes gave them little guidance. 
C. DRAFTING RULES AND PROCESSES 
Instead of the pre-UNDP/BLA project drafting rules guiding the 
drafters in their task, mainly they delineated the routes draft 
79 Eg see Posner, Richard A. The Regulation of the Market in 
Adoptions. 67 Boston University L. Rev. 1987. 59. 
80 
Zambian 
1975. 
8 1 
Eg Quick, Stephen A. Bureaucracy and Rural Socialism: The 
Experience. Stanford: PhD Thesis, Stanford University, 
82 Cf . Nash, June, and Maria Patricia Fernandez Kelly. 1983 . 
Women, Men and the International Division of Labor. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press. 
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bills must travel from Ministry to State Council to BLA and back. 83 
Not a single legislative drafting textbook existed in Chinese. 8 4 
The form of the memorandum that supposedly accompanied and 
justified draft bills remained subject to the drafter's discretion. 
In practice, they did little more than restate the bill's contents. 
Its amorphous character left the drafter to decide what evidence, 
if any, they should present to the State Council or the National 
Peoples Congress in support of their draft bills and that 
granted them equally unlimited discretion to decide what research 
a bill required. 
Nobody can assess the wisdom of a draft bill on its face. 
As Figure 2 suggests, a proposed law will induce the prescribed 
behavior only if it nestles comfortably within the relevant role 
occupants' unique circumstances. Only to the extent that a 
research report details the evidence that exposes the causes of 
those role occupants' existing behaviors can policy-makers assess 
whether the draft bill will likely change them. The form and 
content of the accompanying report serves as a quality control for 
the bill. Its utility for that purpose rests mainly upon its 
detailed structure. To leave the justification for a bill to the 
drafters' discretion especially if they have inappropriate 
notions of the law-society relationship and little social science 
research capacity -- all but ensured insufficient research, and 
83 See above, p. xx. 
84 By contrast, many exist in English, 
concerned almost exclusively with techniques 
together. 
all, regrettably, 
for chaining words 
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therefore insufficient bills . 
D. SUMMARY 
A decade after initiating its Reforms and Open Policy, China's 
government confronted inordinate delays in drafting, and the laws 
passed too often failed to resolve the social problems they 
addressed. At heart, the explanation lay in the drafters' 
adherence to general theories that denied the social engineering 
function of law and their lack of an adequate theory to guide them 
in drafting legislation for that task. In addition, they had an 
inadequate grasp of foreign law and experience and in general 
insufficient social science skills. Vague drafting rules and 
practices reflected both the lack of an adequate theory and a 
miscomprehension of the proper use of foreign law and experience. 
The UNDP /BLA project sought to address these causes of the 
drafters' difficulties 1n trying strengthen China's legal 
framework. 
III 
SOLUTIONS: THE THEORY AND STRATEGY OF THE UNDP/BLA PROJECT 
The project aimed to address all four difficulties by: 
l) facilitating the prompt drafting of the 22 priority bills; 
2) in the process helping the drafters to learn an appropriate 
legislative theory, some social science research skills, and 
knowledge of relevant foreign law and experience and their 
appropriate uses in the drafting enterprise; 
3) by providing funding and assistance for writing a handbook on 
the subject, and by drafting detailed regulations for the 
drafting process, institutionalizing adequate research procedures 
in the drafting process and systematizing drafting in Chinese; 85 
85 See footnote above. 
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and 
4) providing computer capacity to BLA, and putting all Chinese 
laws, regulations, and other rules into appropriate data 
bases. 86 
This section only discusses the project's proposed remedies for 
the first two difficulties: The drafters' limited capacities for 
their task, and the inadequacy of the drafting rules and 
procedures. At heart, both these reflected the absence of an 
adequate legislative theory and methodology. This section 
therefore first describes the legislative theory that underpinned 
the project; and, second, the pedagogical strategy the project 
adopted to teach that theory and methodology. 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE THEORY UNDERPINNING THE PROJECT8 7 
In much of academe and in much of the real world, social 
engineering through law has a bad name. 88 Without a theory 
relating law and behavior, a drafter has no guide to using law to 
solve perceived social problems. Most legislative theory hardly 
deserves the name. What passes for theory mainly denies even the 
possibility of rationally using legislation to bring about social 
change through reason informed by experience . Those theories 
86 By 1994, BLA had substantially accomplished the task of 
putting 13 data bases of Chinese law on line. 
8 7 Robert B. Seidman, "Justifying Legislation .... 
Harv. J. Leg. ( 19 9?) describes the theory and methodology in 
general terms; Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman, State and Law in 
the Development Process: Problem-solving and Institutional Change 
in the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1994) describes it in more 
detail and relates it specifically to the development project. 
88 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London: 
Routledge, 1992); Griffiths; Kidder; Buchanan. 
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typically perceive legislation as the outcome of power struggles 
between interest groups, 89 or a bargaining match between law-makers 
and interest groups. 90 These offer little sustenance to a drafter 
seeking to write a law thatg will work. Jack Davies writes, for 
example, that a drafter's greatest knack lies in finding an 
ambiguous form of words that can paper over disagreement between 
opposing interests. 91 Brody at al. state that the drafter's main 
task consists of satisfying the client --thus uncritically 
importing into the public sphere legal ethics at best approporiate 
to the representation of private clients. Other writers apparently 
have no theory at all. Caldwell's agenda for research for 
drafting consists mainly in research into who constitute the 
conflicting interest groups. Fordham et al. 's agenda focusses 
mainly on the existing state of the law. 92 • 
Everywhere, too easily the drafter runs around like a rat in a 
maze, looking for an exit by butting head at random spots in the 
wall. Too often, the law that results merely defines the desired 
future state of affairs in normative terms, leaving the 
administrators to figure out how to get there: 
"The idea of legal engineering, of achieving social and economic 
89 
90 [Public choice theory] 
91 
92 Thornton, the most widely used drafting text in English 
consists in large part of forms that the drafter might copy , 
suggesting that the author has nothing to offer the drafter to 
guide him to determine what legislation might best solve the 
problem faced in the drafter's particular circumstances. 
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shape through government law, still ranks foremost in the 
arsenal of development techniques. Law as a desired situation 
projected into the future is used as a magic charm. The law-
maker seeks to capture desired economic and social conditions, 
and the practice supposed to lead towards them, in normative 
terms, and leaves the rest to law-enforcement, or expressed more 
generally 1 to the implementation of policy • 11 93 
Rather than try to understand the causes of role occupant 
behavior, and draft laws addressing those causes, drafters too 
often simply prescribe criminal penalties: 
11 Undoubtedly there is a great temptation to make new legal norms 
when legal regulation has failed, instead of identifying the 
causes of failure, and ultimately to use the penal code, as an 
instrument of bringing success, the result of which would be a 
tough 'policy of penalties', the limitation of law to penalty 
only. Such prominence for criminal law has always resulted in 
consequences seriously damaging to modernization, in the slowdown 
of the process, and even in temporary halts. 11 94 
The alternative to a normative depiction of the law-maker's 
vision consists of detailed rules that systematically aim at the 
causes of the problematic social behaviours that excited the 
legislation. The alternative to law's typical punishment 
orientation lies in rules that mainly invoke roundabout measures 
systematically addressing the defects identified in the 
explanations. 95 The alternative to invoking law as magic charm 
lies in invoking it pursuant to reason informed by experience. 
That requires an adequate legislative theory to guide the drafting 
93 Von Benda-Bechmann, 11 Scapegoat and Magic Charm: Law in 
Development Theory and Practice 11 , 28 J. Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 133-34 (1989) . 
94 
Kiado, 
Kalman Kulcsar, Modernization and Law (Budapest: 
1992) 255. 
Akademiai 
95 Robert B. Seidman , State, Law and Development (London: 
Croom Helm, 1978) Chapter xx. 
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enterprise. 
The UNDP/BLA project rested on an institutionalist hypothesis: 
Institutions constitute society's building blocks; law constitutes 
government's chief instrument for creating and changing 
institutions. The project's legislative theory therefore had to 
guide drafters in using law as an instrument for changing the 
repetitive patterns of social behaviours that comprise 
institutions. The pedagogical task of the project centered around 
providing the drafters with an adequate theoretical guide to their 
research into the causes and solutions for social misbehaviours. 
Legislative theory provides that guide by supplying criteria of 
relevance for the nuggets of data that the researcher must win. 
Like all theory, legislative theory performs that function by 
providing a methodology, a perspective, and a set of categories. 
1. Methodology. Methodology begins the task of defining relevant 
evidence. The UNDP project adopted a problem-solving methodology 
qualitatively different from the ends-means methodology more 
commonly used for policy-making. Ends-means methodology requires 
the researcher first to specify the ends desired, and then to 
determine the means of achieving them. 96 That approach conforms 
to the positivist dichotomy between facts and values: Ends derive 
wholly from values, means, from data and experience. That places 
the basis of the new legislative initiative -- the ends -- wholly 
96 Lindblom, Rubin; etc. 
., 
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beyond the reach of reason informed by experience. 97 
Like most drafters, China's drafting teams began to work, not in 
response to the policy-makers' statements of ends, but their 
perceptions of difficulties: Underground water drying up and 
getting polluted; a budgetary process that failed to meet the 
expanding needs of an increasingly decentralized governmental 
system; a mining sector seeking a legal regime to attract foreign 
investment. The drafters needed a methodology to help find 
legislative solutions to these difficulties. 
Adapted to law-making, the problem-solving methodology98 
instructs drafters to conduct empirical investigations -- as the 
Chinese put it, "to learn truth from facts" -- at each of four 
stages: 
a. Identifvinq the difficulty. Perception of a difficulty sparks 
the drafting process. As their first task, the drafters must 
identify the social actors, or role occupants, who behave in ways 
that produces the difficulty their bill aims to ameliorate, and 
provide evidence as to the nature and scope of their 
misbehaviors . 
b. Proposing and warrantinq explanations. Effective laws must 
address the causes of the problematic behaviours. To do that, 
drafters must examine the objective and subjective milieu within 
which role occupants act , propose hypotheses to explain those 
behavior s, and then capture the evidence required to test their 
validity . 
97 See, eg, Max Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences. 
9 8 As used here, 'problem-solving' does not mean 
incrementalism (but cf. Cox, Rober t 1986. "Social Forces, States 
and World Order Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert 
0. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, 1986 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986)). Here , 'problem-solving' as distinguished 
from incrementalism holds open the possibility of addressing issues 
of fundamental institutional change (see Seidman and Seidman, supra 
n , Ch. 4) . 
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c. Assessing proposed laws. The drafters must design new laws 
or regulations that appear likely to eliminate or alter the 
factors that caused the role occupants' problematic behaviors. 
To do that, they must consider alternative possible legislative 
solutions, including those suggested by their review of foreign 
law and experience. To avoid drafting just another 'paper tiger' , 
they must focus especially on data concerning the new law's 
effective implementation. Finally, they must assess the evidence 
as to their probable social and economic costs and benefits to 
decide which to incorporate in their draft bill. So far as we 
know, uniquely in the world, the UNDP/BLA project in their cost-
benefit assessment required Chinese drafters to include 
specifically the effect of the proposed legislation on women, 
children, the poor, minorities and the environment -- that is, 
all the interests usually poorly represented in the halls of 
power, and, without specific requirements that the drafter attend 
to their needs, too easily overlooked. 
d. Monitoring implementation. Finally, the bill must 
incorporate feedback and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that, 
after its passage and implementation, an appropriate monitoring 
agency assesses the new law's social and economic impact. This 
becomes particularly important when pressures to pass legislation 
quickly preclude adequate research. 99 Only such an assessment 
enables law makers to determine whether the relevant social 
actors in fact behave as prescribed, and with the anticipated 
consequences, or whether they must propose additional measures. 
At each stage this agenda requires empirical evidence. The 
second and fourth steps provide the critical links in the agenda's 
underlying logic. The second step overcomes a fundamental weakness 
in the ends-means methodology, which in effect jumps from a 
statement of a difficulty (inverted as a statement of an end) 
directly to the proposed means. By formulating and testing 
explanations of the relevant social actors' behaviors, problem-
solving's second step ensures that, rather than merely poulticing 
symptoms, the solution addresses causes. 
Problem solving's fourth step, requiring monitoring and 
99 
world, 
A reality always confronting drafters throughout third 
and often in the first. 
39 
evaluation of implementation/ provides the essential feedback that 
enables law-makers to learn the law 1 s consequences. In a sense/ 
that step recognizes that every law constitutes a social 
experiment. Its implementation constitutes a test of the process 
of logic and use of evidence that went into its formulation. As do 
all experiments 1 1 00 a legislative experiment generates new 
evidence that practitioners can use to test their hypotheses 1 
leading thus to improvements. Just as the collapse of a bridge 
forces the engineers to question its construction/ its design and 
even the underlying theories of mechanics 1 so a law/ s failure 
should force law-makers to review all the preceding steps of the 
problem-solving methodology. Monitoring and evaluation make 
possible the use of reason informed by e xperience to guide the law-
making enterprise. 
The problem- solving methodologyts four stages tell drafters what 
part of the prairies to plough in order likely to find evidence to 
justify a proposed bill. The drafterts perspectives also guide 
them in making the unavoidable discretionary choices along the way . 
2 . Perspectives: the function of grand theory . That problem-
solving rests on data does not imply that it is "value-free". 
Drafters must make discretionary choices at each step: In 
determining what difficulty to examine 1 what hypothetical 
explanations to test against the evidence/ what range of possible 
legislative solutions to assess 1 and what counts as adequate 
100 Dewey 
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implementation. Researchers can guide those discretionary choices 
in one of three ways: By their domain assumptions (that is, the --
usually unexamined -- baggage of valuations and propositions about 
what makes the world go that we all carry with us101 ); by ideal 
types of the good society1 02 -- what President Bush called "the 
vision thing"; or by grand theory (that is, large scale 
explanations of the world, such as Adam Smith's explanation for 
mercantilism, or Karl Marx's, for nineteenth century 
capitalism) . 1 03 Of these, only grand theory in principle consists 
of propositions justified by reason informed by experience. To the 
extent that in problem-solving researchers guide their 
discretionary choices by grand theory, those choices ultimately 
rest on reason informed by experience. 
That differs from the usual notion of grand theory's function in 
policy-oriented research. Usually, people think of grand theory as 
delineating in generalized terms a picture of (or metaphor for) 
reality. A researcher can therefore solve the social problem 
addressed in terms of that metaphor, and apply the policy outcome 
to the real world. Makgetla once wrote that it as though one 
described his true love as a red, red rose -- and then wooed her 
1 0 1 Gouldner, 
Sociology. N.Y.: 
Alvin. 1970. 
Basic Books. 
The Coming Crisis of Western 
102 Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences. 
Trs. and eds.: Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, Ill: 
Free Press, 1949. 
103 For a brief comparison of these grand theories in 
relationship to the issues of third world development, see Seidman 
and Seidman, supra n. xx, Ch. 5. 
41 
(as the metaphor suggests) with dew and well-rotted manure. By 
contrast, the legislative theory used in the UNDP /BLA project 
employs grand theory only as a guide to discretionary choices in 
the course of problem-solving. Thus does it serve the function of 
winnowing out relevant evidence. 
3. Categories. Researchers also need a set of boxes in which 
to classify the available facts -- variously labelled "categories", 
"vocabulary" 104 or "concepts". A theory's categories must focus 
on explanatory factors relevant to the kinds of problems it aims to 
resolve. Together with methodology and grand theory, categories 
help guide towards the relevant evidence. 
Categories guide empirical research indirectly. They invariably 
come in broad terms-- "incentives", "transaction costs", "class", 
"values and attitudes". These capacious words properly have the 
function not of telling researchers precisely what to do, but to 
inspire "middle level propositions" . 105 Those relately detailed 
hypotheses, subsumed by the relevant broad category, and resonating 
with the researcher's grand theory, spark the search for falsifying 
data. Thus do categories guide the hunt for data. The legislative 
theory that underpinned the UNDP /BLA project incorporated the 
teachings of law and development studies106 and the sociology of 
104 Finch 
105 George Homans 
106 For the theoretical background, see Ann Seidman and 
State and Law in the Development Process -
Institutional Change in the Third World 
Robert B. Seidman, 
Problem-Solving and 
(Macmillan, 1994) 
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law. 
a. The underlying model. The theory posits a basic model of the 
factors likely to influence a social actor' s 1 0 7 choice as to how 
to behave in the face of a law (Fig. 3) . 1 08 
============================================================== 
FIGURE 3 
A MODEL OF LAW AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR(a) 
country-specific 
circumstances 
feedback 
rule 
Implementing 
institutions 
country-specific 
circumstances 
Law makers 
rule 
sanctions 
feedback 
feedback 
role 
occupant 
country-specific 
circumstances 
=============================================================== 
The model holds that role occupants behave as they do in the face 
of a rule of law not merely because of the rule itself, but also 
because of the constraints and resources in the role-occupant's time-
and place-specific circumstances, including the behavior of 
implementing institutions. It implies that a law that induces one 
sort of behavior in a particular time and place will only 
serindipitously induce the same behavior in another time and place; 
whatever the similarity of the rules, the country-specific 
1 07 
that is, 
Derived from sociology, we use the term 'role occupant', 
the addressee of a norm. 
1 08 The model derives from three sources: l) legal realism 
(eg, Karl Llewellyn ) ; 2) Fredrik Barth. Models of Social 
Organization. Royal Anthropological Institute. Occas i onal Paper 
23. Glasgow: The University P. 1966); and 3) Hans Kelsen, General 
Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. P. 1949 . 
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circumstances always differ. 
To write a law that actually changes the role occupants' 
behavior, the drafter must ensure effective implementation. 109 
The common complaint, that "we 
implementation" states an oxymoron. 
have good laws, but bad 
A badly implemented law by 
definition does not warrant the characterization of "good". A sine 
qua non of a "good" law (in this sense) is that it effectively 
channels the behavior of its addressees into conformity. 110 A law 
that, on pain of punishment, merely prescribes the opposite of the 
behaviors that constitute an existing social problem111 addresses 
only a presumed failure of incentives as the cause of the 
misbehaviors. In most cases, that misses most of the causes of 
misbehaviour, and hence must inevitably fail to bring about its 
prescribed solution. A drafter must provide for the 
implementation of the new law, both by addressing those causes in 
detail, and by prescribing rules that make likely effective 
implementing agency behaviour. A competent set of categories 
constitutes the foundation for acurate analysis of the causes of 
both role occupant and implementing agency behaviors. 
The same categories can guide drafters as well in formulating 
legislative solutions. General explanations for behavior also 
serve as predictions of future behavior. It particular, the 
categories that serve to excite hypotheses that explain behavior in 
109 
llO 
111 Supra, text at n. 63 [Benda-Bechtmann] 
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face of a law can equally excite a legislative solution that will 
likely change the behaviors of the law's addressees-- i.e., a law 
susceptible of effective implementation. 
b. The ROCCIPI categories. Most legal realists would likely 
agree with the insights incorporated in Figure 3. That model, 
however, leaves vague all the non-legal social and other 
constraints and resources that influence choice. The realists' 
descendants disagreed among themselves about which factors within 
that milieu would likely influence specific role occupants' 
behavioral choices. One of realism's most vociferous descendants, 
law and economics, for example, argued that law makers should limit 
their interventions to reducing transaction costs, that is, to 
removing impediments to a free market 112 That directed them to 
consider as causes of behavior only a limited range: blocks to 
factor mobility, barriers to market entry, poor market information, 
insufficient incentives, and so forth. 113 That blinded them from 
considering other causal factors that might explain the behaviours 
at issue. 114 Another of realism's children, sociological 
jurisprudence, tended to limit the search for explanations to role 
occupants' values and attitudes. 115 That constricted possible 
112 Posner, etc. 
113 Stokey and Zeckhauser 
114 Stokey and Zeckhauser stated this quite bluntly: [quote] 
115 Roche , J.P. and M.M. Gordon. Can Morality be Legislated? 
New York Times Magazine, May 22 , 1955) (Values and attitudes as 
primary if not sole explanation for addressees' failures to obey 
the law.); Lawrence Friedman, The legal Culture .. . . 
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legislative solutions to changing the institutions that selected 
and socialized the role occupants. 
To avoid missing critical causes of behavior, drafters need, not 
narrowly restrictive categories, but expansive ones. Drafters 
whose categories omit factors likely to influence behavior cannot 
propose detailed, implemntable measures to change the behaviors. 
Instead, the drafter resorts to broad prohibitions of the undesired 
behaviors supported by penalties both draconian and 
unimplementable. 
The legislative theory employed by the UNDP/BLA project -- call 
it an 11 institutionalist 11 research agenda specified a set of 
categories that subsumed and went beyond those of both law and 
economics and sociology of law. 116 That agenda addresses three 
sets of factors: (1) The rule of lawi factors that bring the role 
occupant to the point of choice (opportunity, capacity, and 
communication) i and factors that influence choice (interest, 
process and ideology) 
(1). The Rules. Behaviour takes place within a cage of laws. 
As suggested by Figure 3, those rules constitute an important 
constraint or resource that the role-occupant must take into 
account in choosing a course of behaviour . 117 What behaviors do 
the relevant laws specify? How precisely do they prescribe those 
behaviors? (The broader the discretion of role-occupants, the 
116 Seidman, 
Seidman .... 
State Law and Developmenti 
117 [Book review of Hurst] 
Seidman and 
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more likely they will act pursuant to their personal interests or 
values and ideologies) Do the laws specify adequate implementation 
procedures with adequate resources for enforcement? Do they 
provide for monitoring their implementation? 
In addition to examining the particular rule directly addressing 
the problem at hand, researchers must consider the larger framework 
of laws and implementing agencies within which role occupants act. 
For example, water polluters act not only in light of the rules 
conventionally labelled "water pollution law", or "environmental 
law", but within a system of laws affecting water use: property 
law, contract law, water law, tax law, constitutional law, and so 
forth. That legal framework always implicitly includes the general 
rule that what the law does not forbid, it permits . Unless a law 
expressly forbids landowners from polluting streams that run 
through their property, they have a legal right to pollute it . 
(2). The Requirements of Choice. Most theories of action analyze 
only how a person chooses to behave within a given institutional 
framework. 118 Serious social problems, however, frequently arise 
because the institutional framework insulates relevant actors from 
the point of choice. To obey implies conscious choice. (To say 
that a babe in arms "obeys" the law against driving a car faster 
than the legal speed-limit misuses the word "obeys") . A role-
occupant will consciously choose to obey a law only when, in 
addition to the existence of a relevant rule, three additional 
categories of factors coincide: 
118 Cf . Parsons, a Theory of Action [?] 
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(a) The role occupant's institutional and physical 
environment supplies an opportunity to choose to obey or 
disobey. A banker has many opportunities to embezzle other 
people's money; a poor person very few. 
(b). The role occupant has the capacity to obey; that is, 
she possesses the skills and resources to perform the task 
the law prescribes. For example, a rule that directs 
legislative drafters to draft good bills will not likely 
achieve its objective if the drafters lack adequate 
knowledge of legislative theory and techniques. A new law 
cannot create competent role occupants by mere fiat. To 
locate the causes of role occupant incapacities, drafters 
must analyze the institutions that select and socialize role 
occupants. 
(c) . The role occupant knows of the applicable rule, that 
is, that the rule has been communicated to her. For example, 
China's Fisheries Law required the responsible ministry to 
define the minimum size mesh for fish-nets for various 
localities and species. 1 1 9 Unless the fishermen know about 
that lawand the relevant regulations, they will obey only 
by accident. 120 As the basis for remedial legislation, 
drafters must investigate the causes of relevant 
instititions' failures to communicate the law. 
(3). Factors influencing choice. Once a role occupant confronts 
the necessity of choice, three factors may influence that choice: 
(a) . Material incentives have a powerful influence on 
119 
1 20 Here, researchers should consider: ( 1) whether the form of 
the legislation adequately communicates the law-makers' intention 
(Allott, Antony. 1980. The Limits of Law. London: Butterworths, 
pp. 236-37; Rubin, Edward L. 1989. Law and Legislation in the 
Administrative State. 89 Col. L. Rev. pp. 408 et seq); and (2) 
whether the way law-makers communicate the law to its addressees 
promotes their understanding of it (R. B. Seidman, 1972. The 
Communication of Law and the Process of Development in Anglophonic 
Africa. Wise. L. Rev. 680, p. 680; Gifford, D.J. 1970. 
Communication of Legal Standards Policy Development and Effective 
Conduct Regulation. 56 Cornell L. Q. 409. Robertson, John H., 
Robertson and Phyllis Teitlebaum. 1973. Optimizing Legal Impact: A 
Case Study in Search of a Theory. Wi se. L. Rev. 665. pp. 695ff). 
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choice. 121 Drafters must discover whether role occupants 
perceive the behaviors prescribed by the law as serving 
their interest. That requires examining the various 
incentives and disincentives thrown up by the role-
occupants' environment. Those include legal sanctions: 
not mere paper penalties or (less frequently) rewards, 
but those that implementing authorities will likely 
impose. If role occupants violate a criminal law, for 
example, what likelihood exists that implementing 
institutions will detect the violation, arrest the 
perpetrator, and impose criminal sanctions? 
(b). Individually or in complex organizations, whether 
role occupants obey a law depends in part upon the 
process by which they reach their decision. For example, 
if the ministry which manages a national park conducts 
negotiations with a foreign firm concerning the 
exploitation of minerals within the park in secret, it 
may make a different decision than if it holds public 
hearings at which environment-protection groups testify. 
In its larger sense, process determines whether and to 
what extent the state and the legal order foster 
democratic community participation (see Fig . 4) . 1 2 2 
(c) Although values and attitudes -- broadly, ideology 
alone do not determine social behavior, 1 2 3 nevertheless 
role occupants' world views do influence their actions. 
First, societal sentiments commonly sway their choices. 
In China as throughout the third world, especially in 
rural areas, for example, traditional values favoring 
large families frequently persuaded women and men to try 
to evade government policies aimed at limiting family 
size. 1 2 4 Second, and more pervasively, actors' actions 
acquire meaning only 1n the context of their own 
1 2 1 Drawing on neoclassical economic theory, law and economics 
theorists tend to narrow explanations for social actors' behavior 
solely to their 'interests' (eg, Posner, Richard A. 1987. The 
Economic Analysis of Law. 
12 2 Process may also determine what the role occupant ever 
reaches the point of choice, for it determines what issues the 
institution will accept for decision. See Bachrach and Baratz 
1 23 But see note xx [Roche; Friedman] 
1 2 4 In post-reform China, rural families not infrequently 
tried to evade the one child family policy by not registering 
second children, especially girls. 
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subjective understandings, their "domain assumptions" . 125 
Drafters, for example, can only explain why one person 
gives another some thin metal discs if they know how the 
actors perceive the discs: Perhaps as medals, and the 
recipient as a craftsman who will polish them; as 
religious objects, and the recipient as a priest or 
shaman; or as money, and the recipient as a tradesman 
receiving them as payment. 12 6 To explain role occupants' 
decisions in the face of law, researchers must understand 
the ideologies that define their relevant behaviors. 127 
Researchers cannot rest there. Once again, they must 
analyze the institutions that so selected and socialized 
role occupants that they have the ideologies they do. 
Together, broadly construed, these seven categories arguably 
encompass all the factors likely to influence the behavior of any 
given role occupants. (A mnemonic, ROCCIPI, helps to remember 
them: Bule, Qpportunity, ~apacity, ~ommunication, ~nterest, 
~rocess and ~deology) . For each category, drafters should review 
the evidence and critically assess all the middle-level explanatory 
propositions suggested by alternative large scale theoretical 
125 Weber, Max, 1949. Max Weber on the Methodology of the 
Social Sciences. Trs. and eds.: Edward A. Shils and Henry A. 
Finch. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press: 87 ff; T. Talcott Parsons, 
"Introduction", in id: 3, 10 ff; Schutz, Alfred 1965. The Social 
World and the Theory of Social Action in Braybrooke, David, ed. 
The Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987??????. 
126 Winch, Peter, 1958. The Idea of a Social Science and its 
Relation to Philosoohv. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 117; 
Kronman, A. Precedent and Tradition. (1990) 99 Yale L. J.1029: 
1051; Weber, Max. Economy and Society. G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978~ 7. 
127 Moore, Omar K., and Anderson, Alan R., "Puzzles, Games 
and Social Interaction" in Braybrooke, Philosophical 
Problems .... 1965:68. 72; Ellickson, Robert C. 1986. On Coase and 
Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County. 38 
Stan. L. Rev. 623. 
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explanations . 1 28 They should then incorporate the seemingly most 
fruitful into the hypotheses that constitute the map to guide their 
collection of facts. 129 Warranted by evidence (or, more likely, 
revised in light of evidence) , these explanations will logically 
suggest concrete new measures to eliminate or alter the causes they 
reveal, and therefore likely to induce more desirable behavior. 
Thus can the categories that their legislative theory provides 
guide the drafter's search for relevant evidence to justify their 
draft bills. 
c. The complexity of implementing institutions. The 
ROCCIPI agenda purports to guide research into behavior in the face 
of a rule. As Fig. 3 argues, implementing agencies also behave in 
the face of rules. That agenda can, therefore, also guide 
investigations into implementing agency behavior. 
Too often, observers deal with a complex organization by invoking 
a metaphor of a single rational actor . 130 Complex decision-
making structures, however, involve the interacting behaviors of 
many actors, each behaving as they do in the face of a set of 
128 Different theorists' perspectives, or grand theories, 
generate very different explanations for social actors' behaviors. 
Neoclassical economists, for example, emphasize micro-level 
entrepreneurs' interests, whereas institutionalist economists tend 
to focus on historically-shaped structures and class relationships 
(Seidmans. State and Law in the Development Process, Ch. 5) 
129 Sometimes, consideration of explanations in one or more 
category may seem superfluous. For example, law-makers usually 
communicate relevant rules and their contents to key role 
occupants, officials, in government implementing agencies. 
130 Allison, Graham T. 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
1971. Essence of Decision; Explaining 
Boston: Little, Brown. 
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rules. To explain a complex decision requires that we explain 
those interacting behaviors. By blinding drafters to those 
processes, the rational actor metaphor hinders them from adequately 
explaining implementing agency behaviors. 
As the first step in discovering the factors likely to influence 
their counter-productive decisions, a simple input-output process 
model (Figure 4) helps to locate a complex institution's relevant 
role occupants. 
================================================================ 
Figure 4131 
A MODEL FOR ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
input 
processes 
conversion output 
processes processes 
feedback processes 
================================================================= 
Figure 4 suggests significant categories for investigating 
organizational decision-making. It teaches that the general tenor 
of agency decisions depend upon how the agency's structure and 
processes132 • Those processes consist of sets of role occupants, 
acting in the face of both formal and informal rules (see Figure 
131 The conventional input -output decision-making model 
explains particular decisions by examining how particular inputs, 
feedbacks and conversion process worked in that instance (e.g., 
Hose, Edgar F. 1975. Organization Development and Change. St. 
Paul: West Publishing: 35). Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz 
(1963. Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 
American Political Science Review 632) argued this model fails to 
explain 'non-decisions', issues which never even enter the system. 
It ensures decision outputs that never threaten power structures. 
This model set out in Figure 4 transforms the simple input-output 
model as explaining a single decisions in to a process model that 
purports to explain the thrust of a range of decisions. It does 
that by focusing on the processes and structures that determine 
both what issues to process and their outcomes. (R. B. Seidman, 
1978. State, Law and Development. London: Croom-Helm). 
132 (Hose, supra n. :37 
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3). Input processes accept, filter and change the inputs (i.e., 
issues, facts, theories and personnel) the various sets of role 
occupants within the agency will consider. Feedback processes 
determine whose and what feedbacks they will receive about previous 
decisions' effects. 133 Conversion processes define how agency 
personnel will combine these elements in deciding whether and how 
to implement the law. Thus do an agency's processes determine the 
range of its decisions. 
Process determines participation, and thus whose interests the 
agency will represent. If implementing agencies' decision-making 
processes only permit the rich and powerful to supply issues and 
evidence, implementing decisions will tend to favor power and 
privilege. If those processes ensure participation by the mass of 
the population, the decisions of the implementing agency may tend 
more towards addressing the needs of the poor and disinherited. 
Process defines democratic participation in government. 
While process shapes substance, the converse also holds: When 
law-makers come to fashion a solution, the kinds of outputs they 
desire ought to determine their choice of implementing structures 
and processes. To justify proposals for structuring an 
implementing agency's decision-making processes in particular ways, 
a drafters must present convincing evidence that the proposed 
processes will create input, feedback and conversion processes 
likely to produce a range of implementing decisions appropriate to 
enforcing the law at hand. Only then will policy-makers have any 
133 Deutsch; Hose:37 
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way of assessing whether the proposed implementation processes will 
likely produce the desired outcomes. 
Together, the problem-solving methodology, the ROCCIPI research 
agenda and the decision-making model served as the foundational 
building blocks of the UNDP/BLA project's learning process. 
B. STRATEGIES FOR TRAINING DRAFTERS: THE LEARNING PROCESS 
The UNDP/BLA project pedagogical strategy rested on the notion 
that its task did not consist of teaching legislative theory and 
methodology, but of training drafters. It aimed to enhance the 
participating drafters capacity by engaging them in drafting of the 
22 quality priority bills, and on that occasion helping them to 
acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to use relevant 
legislative theory and specific drafting techniques. This section 
examines three aspects of that learning process: The 
institutionalization of the research report; the project's 
learning-by-doing pedagogical approach; and the unanticipated 
problems stemming from the drafters lack of adequate social science 
skills. 
1. The institutionalization of the research report . 134 The 
legislative theory on which the project rested underscores that 
competent legislation must rest on competent research. As Figure 
3 holds, behavior depends not merely on the rule, but on the entire 
non-legal surround within which the role occupant chooses. Without 
134 At first, the project denoted the research report as a 
Memorandum of Law , a title drawn from British legislative practice 
(see R.B. Seidman, "The Memorandum of Law" Harvard Journal of 
Legislation, 1992) . Later, BLA and the CTAs changed this to 
research report, as better describing its contents. 
54 
an adequate investigation of that non-legal surround, drafters have 
no assurance that their bills will in fact induce the desired 
behavior; without knowing the research on which the drafter bases 
the claim that the bill will induce that behavior, law-makers 
cannot assess the quality of the draft. Absent information about 
the underlying research, decision-makers must make that judgment on 
the basis of their own experience and prejudices -- both famously 
unreliable. 
The project adopted a requirement that a drafting team accompany 
its bill with a quality research report, with a highly structured 
contents. That requirement had three implications. (i) Drafters 
could no longer accompany their bills by a hastily stitched-
together memoranda that merely gave simplified explanations of 
their contents. They now had to produce two quality documents for 
every proposed law: the bill itself, and a carefully-structured 
research report. ( ii) The requirement that the research report 
conform to the dictates of the problem-solving methodology and the 
ROCCIPI research agenda established a set of norms for the research 
the drafters must undertake. (iii) The research report provided 
the basis for informed assessment by decision-makers about the 
quality of the bill. 
The Chinese have now institutionalized the requirement of a 
research report in two ways. First, as one of the 22 priority 
bills, a drafting team prepared procedural regulations for the BLA 
and the DLAs. It is expected that when completed those regulations 
will include a requirement that each bill come with a structured 
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research report. Second, the textbook on drafting in Chinese135 
will include a section explaining the importance of the research 
report and specifying its required form. 
2. Pedagogical method: 'Riding the bicycle'. The project' s 
learning process used a learning-by-doing pedagogical method. 
Drafters learned theory, methodology and legislative techniques in 
the course of working on specific bills. 1 36 Both Chinese and 
foreign educators have criticized China's legal education system's 
almost excludive reliance on lectures as the system of 
instruction. 137 To explicate the project's alternative 
pedagogical method, the project used the metaphor of 'riding a 
bicycle.' If for a month an expert lectured students about the 
theory and practice of bicycles, at the end of that time the 
students probably still could not ride one. In contrast, anyone 
can show novices how bikes work and help them get on one. In a 
short time they can peddle away. This section reviews the three 
elements of the project's training system: summer workshops, four-
month fellowships abroad, and short study tours. 
135 The principal author of the manual participated as a 
trainer in the team that drafted the BLA's regulations for drafting 
legislation. 
13 6 This approach attempted to respond to the pedagogical 
problem the CTAs had encountered when teaching as Fulbright 
Professors in Peking University in 1988-89, the same problem 
identified by the Alford Report in 1993: Traditional Chinese 
higher education courses focus almost entirely on what Paolo Freire 
termed the 'sponge method': lectures through which the teacher 
pours The Word into the students' minds, and examinations which 
squeeze it out again -- usually leaving very little behind. 
1 37 Eg, see Alford and Fang Liufang, supra n. 
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a. The summer workshops . The summer workshops138 hads two 
objectives, to teach general legislative theory, and foreign law 
and experience. First, they aimed to introduce all the drafting 
team members --some 180 in all -- to legislative theory in the 
context of their work with their foreign consultants on their 
bills. Each workshop dealt with only 5 to 10 bills . 139 During 
the first week, at first we as CTAs, then later with the trainers, 
help, engaged the drafters in thinking through the implications of 
the theory as a guide to their research reports, and as to what 
they might learn from foreign law and experience (especially, it 
taught that no country can successfully copy the law of another 
country) . For these sessions, BLA translated an article140 which 
described the legislative theory and methodology, as well as some 
sociology of law readings that drew on Chinese materials141 
In the 1992 workshop, the meager quality of their draft research 
reports and bills reflected the trainers and the other participants 
absence of prior contact with legislative theory. For subsequent 
138 The project originally scheduled three summer workshops, 
all of which have been completed (in 1992, 1993, and 1994.) 
Another is now scheduled for 1995. 
139 see Appendix II for the 22 bills. In 1994, the UNDP, the 
BLA and the Ministry of Labour agreed to add three more dealing 
with old age pensions, workers, compensation, unemployment 
compensation and occupational safety and health. 
140
• Robert B. Seidman, The Memorandum of Law, 15 Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal xx (19xx) . 
141 Prepared by the CTAs and others for a course at Peking 
University. 
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sessions, we held two-day workshops in the springM2 to teach the 
rudiments of legislative theory to the two drafters selected from 
each team to become trainers. The trainers, in turn, worked with 
their teams to prepare draft bills and to outline research reports 
for the summer sessions. Some of the trainers who had completed 
the BU study course assisted in the following summer the teams 
whose members came from their DLAs. 
From the outset, communication between the drafters and the 
consultants proved difficult. In the first week of the summer 
workshops, a highly qualified translator translated into Chinese 
our introductory remarks relating to the use of theory. Then, 
sitting together as a group at separate round tables in the 
conference room, the members of each drafting team discussed (in 
Chinese) the implications of the topic for their work. For 
example, after an introduction to the problem solving methodology, 
the drafting teams discussed the social problems their bills 
addressed, and critically reviewed their initial explanatory 
hypotheses. After an explanation of the ROCCIPI agenda, they 
sought to identify, in the Chinese context, the relevant role 
occupants and the social problems constituted by their behaviors; 
and the hypotheses they had generated for those behaviors by 
considering each of the ROCCIPI categories, and the available 
142 The CTAs returned to China each spring to participate in 
annually tripartite assessment of the project's progress which, 
under UNDP rules, involved representatives of the BLA, the China 
UNDP off ice, and CICETE (the Chinese government's agency for 
managing the finances and supervising all foreign assistance 
programs) . 
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evidence relating to those hypotheses. After the teams discussed 
a topic for 30 to 45 minutes, two or three of the teams reported on 
bills, followed by discussion. (The translator translated all the 
statements from English to Chinese and vice versa, a tedious 
process) . By the end of the first week, most of the teams had at 
least outlined the main difficulties and had begun to identify the 
central role occupants and the behaviors their bills aimed to 
address. 
Second, the summer workshops aimed to expose the drafters to 
relevant foreign law and experience -- and how to learn from it. 
A central theme of the first week concerned the uses and abuses of 
foreign law in drafting. When the foreign consultants arrived at 
the beginning of the second week, the teams had begun to structure 
the questions they wished the consultants to address. 1 43 With its 
consultant, each team of six to eight members then met separately 
for two weeks of intensive small seminars . 144 
143 About a month before the summer workshop, in both In 1993 
and '94, the trainees had sent the teams' draft bills and research 
reports to the consultants. These enabled the latter to bring with 
them foreign legislative materials likely to prove the most useful. 
The research reports also laid the basis for each seminar's agenda. 
Since all the drafters lived in the same hotel, they easily 
arranged their working schedules to facilitate the most fruitful 
discussions and work sessions. Usually, a team member served as 
translator. Unfortunately, their translating abilities varied. 
Communication with our Chinese colleagues constituted the most 
sertious constraint on the project's effectiveness. 
144 The CTAs drew on networks of contacts throughout the world 
to nominate three candidate consultants for each bill; the 
relevant drafting team made the final selection. To avoid possible 
conflicts of interest, the UNDP/BLA project document specifically 
excluded nominees who themselves or whose firms were currently 
engaged in business in China. Most of the consultants had worked 
as university teachers. The consultants reflected as wide array of 
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The consultants played a role somewhat different from that of 
many foreign consultants. Although on its face ludicrous, in China 
as elsewhere many foreign experts have frequently drafted laws for 
their host country. As elsewhere, in China these efforts have too 
often produced mere copies of foreign laws, that rarely produce in 
the new country the same behaviors as they induced 1n their 
countries of origin. 145 In contrast, the UNDP/BLA project 
expected its consultants to serve primarily as resource persons, 
providing information about relevant laws and experience in other 
countries, and more generally, as counsellors and advisors. Almost 
all of the consultants had many years of teaching experience, most, 
considerable experience as well in counselling clients. They were 
nominated in part because they had a well-developed sense of the 
law-society relationship . 146 
That the drafting groups worked with their consultants to produce 
international experience as could be arranged, given time and 
logistical constraints; for example, in 1993, the group of 
consultants included a Dane, a South Korean, two Englishmen, and a 
Chilean. 
~5 See, e.g., The EnvironmentalProtection Law (1979), Article 
6 (requring an environmental impact statement in planning new or 
extended projects, obviously modelled on U. S. law. In the Untied 
States, the environemntal impact statement has served an admirable 
purposes in implementing environment laws because tow preconditions 
existed: A numbner of non-governmental organizations existed with 
the expertise, resources and will to challenge impact statem,ents, 
and a court system long accustomed to trying cases between citizen 
and government. Neither of these condityions exist in China.) 
146 Notably, the project did not expect its consultants to 
have a special Chinese expertise; Chinese, after all, know their 
own law and social conditions. Foreign consultants brought 
information about other countries' efforts to use law to deal with 
problems analogous to those that the drafters sought to address. 
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a revised version of their draft research report and bill proved an 
indispensable pedagogical tool. Instead of teaching abstractions 
about legislative theory and methodology and about foreign law and 
experience, the consultants found themselves training people to 
write better research reports and bills. That concrete task 
transformed the learning exercise from one of digesting vast 
amounts of difficult philosophical and social science notions into 
the concrete tasks of organizing and writing reports and bills. 
Learning to ride the bicycle really does require getting in the 
seat and starting to pedal. 
At a two day plenary session at the end of the three weeks' work, 
the drafting teams and the consultants reported on what they had 
learned. As expected, none of the teams had completed their bills. 
Their discussions had structured presently available information in 
ways useful for develioping a legislative program to resolve the 
social problem at issue, and had identified a research agenda as 
to the additional evidence they should look for, both in China and 
in their study tours abroad. Comments at the spring tripartite 
evaluation sessions suggested the summer workshops did help to 
improve the relevant team members drafting skills. 
b. The trainers' four month course of study. As a second major 
component of the learning process, two trainers from each drafting 
team spent four months in a specially-tailored program in the 
Boston University School of Law. The UNDP\BLA project document 
specified that, when the trainers went abroad to study legislative 
theory and their particular areas of comparative law, they should 
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go in groups and if possible live together. Dealing in a foreign 
language and a foreign culture, they could assist each other to 
maximize their benefits from the learning process . 147 Given a 
sizable group, furthermore, the host university could lay on a 
program adequate to meet their collective and individual needs. 
The program BU laid on for the trainers had six elements: 
(1) Working in teams of two, under the supervision of professors 
from BU or, where appropriate, from other Boston area 
universities, the trainers' read intensively in the 
comparative law and experience in their respective fields, 
and further developed their research reports and bills. 
(2) The trainers participated actively in a Law and Development 
Seminar in which a number of BU law students148 worked in 
groups together with the Chinese drafters to study 
legislative theory and methodology. Each BU student wrote 
a 30-60 page term paper (essentially a research report) 
explicating the relevant law and experience of a third world 
country (other than China) on topics relevant to the Chinese 
drafters' bills. These added substantially to the trainers' 
knowledge of relevant foreign law and experience. 
( 3) The trainers attended a weekly seminar ln 
drafting techniques, designed especially to 
needs. 
legislative 
meet their 
(4) The trainers attended a weekly workshop in which they 
systematically critiqued each other's draft bills and 
research reports. Experience in the China project, as well 
as in the BU experience in teaching legislative drafting to 
US students, 149 proved these critiques an excellent method 
of deepening their understanding of legislative theory. 
147 This proved especially important since, although most of 
the trainers had studied English, and all could read it (albeit 
some very slowly) , some had not sufficiently mastered the ability 
to understand it when spoken, no matter how slowly; a few had to 
rely heavily on their compatriots to translate for them. 
148 All, of course, graduates, most with work experience in 
and some of them citizens of other third world countries. 
149 A legislative drafting program in which BU students 
prepare bills for government officials and legislators ln the 
Boston area. 
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( 5) In the 1994 session, 
workshop in social 
legislative drafters. 
a sociologist will give a weekly 
science reswearch techniques for 
(6) A few of the trainers audited courses in the Law School 
related to the subjects of their bills. 150 
On their return to China, these trainers played a leading role 
in facilitating their respective teams' completion of their bills 
and research reports for the State Council. Some ministries 
assigned them to teach other drafters, both nationally and on 
provincial levels. A number received promotions in their 
respective departments, becoming deputy and even division 
directors. 
c. Short-term study tours. The UNDP/BLA project sent most of the 
non-trainer drafting team members on short-term tours abroad to 
study foreign law in action. Mainly, these consisted of interviews 
with operating personnel in the various countries. After completing 
their trips, the teams wrote reports on their findings. 
Originally, we had looked on these tours with some skepticism. 
When an engineer goes on a study tour, she can examine concrete 
artifacts -- a bridge, a sewer or water system, a factory. What 
would legislative drafters examine? Too easily, these trips might 
become costly boon-doggles, giving the drafters merely an expense-
paid tour of foreign countries. 
The tour reports submitted by the teams, however, suggested that 
150 The fact that most BU courses, as in other US law schools, 
focused on US-related issues, coupled with language difficulties, 
prevented the trainers from learning much from them. This further 
underscored the necessity of designing a tailor-made program to 
meet their needs. 
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our skepticism erred: Using what they had learned during the 
summer workshops as guides, the drafters seemed to have learned a 
good deal from their tours. For example, the report on tour to 
study securities laws elsewhere explained how the Korean law of 
securities operated, its advantages and disadvantages in the Korean 
context, and the extent to which the Korean experience had 
relevance for the Chinese situation. 
3. Drafters as competent consumers of research findings. No 
one can 'learn truth from facts' without access to 'the facts' In 
the course of the project, however, it became increasingly evident 
that the Chinese drafters lacked the skills necessary to gather and 
assess the evidence required to test hypothes explaining role 
occupants' behaviors. 
Obviously, drafters themselves can only rarely undertake all the 
research required to ground their legislative proposals in the 
facts. Unlike academics, they operate under severe time 
constraints. They need a methodology appropriate, not necessarily 
to the academic, but to the policy- and law-making enterprise. 
That suggests four criteria for training drafters ln social 
science research skills. ( 1) Drafters always know a good deal 
about their own culture. If on Friday they must start drafting a 
bill and memorandum for presentation on Monday, rather than 
employing a by-guess-and-by-God methodology, at least they should 
try to order the facts they already know in relevant categories 
like those suggested by the ROCCIPI research agenda, draft on that 
basis, and identify the gaps in their factual information. (2) 
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More frequently than not, time constraints require them to conduct 
their search for facts, not in the field, but in the library. They 
require enough knowledge of social science research techniques to 
assess the utility and worth of the research findings they may 
discover there. (3) If no one else has conducted relevant 
research, they may also need enough understanding of research 
techniques to work with researchers who have the time and skills to 
undertake it. (4) Finally, they need comprehend the limits as well 
as potential uses of qualitative research that may indicate trends, 
but provides no quantitative measure of their dimensions. As for 
most Americans, for many Chinese behavioral research means surveys, 
with random samples, coded questionnaires, data banks and the rest. 
Drafters almost never have either time or resources for original 
quantitative surveys, nor do they invariably prove helpful. 
Drafters or researchers with whom they work, however, may have time 
to conduct interviews or to meet with focus groups151 to identify 
difficulties and to test explanatory hypotheses. Drafters need 
training adequate to understand and use the results of those kinds 
of techniques for gathering qualitative information. 
As originbally written, the UNDP/BLA project did not adequately 
provide for improving the drafters' social science capacities. At 
the summer workshops, the foreign consultants did discuss, not only 
the social impact of particular laws in other countries' 
circumstances, but also the research techniques employed to assess 
151 Small groups of people with relevant knowledge of the 
problems of concern (see ) . 
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those experiences. The 1993 BU program included some sessions of 
the legislative drafting techniques seminar to sensitizing trainers 
to the importance of appropriate social science research; and in 
1994, a sociologist will teach a two-hour a week course on the 
subject. 
C. SUMMARY: THE LEARNING PROCESS 
The project sought to remedy the perceived causes of China's felt 
needs for faster and better drafting. First, it addressed the 
problem of the drafters' misconceptualization of the drafting task 
and the absence of an adequate legislative theory by teaching a 
legislative theory that rested at every point on reason informed by 
experience. Second, it sought to remedy the lack of knowledge 
about foreign law and experience by using foreign consultants at 
the summer workshop, extensive reading for the trainers during the 
four-month sojourn at BU, and by the drafters' two-week study 
tours. Third, it sought to remedy the weaknesses in the drafting 
regulations by institutionalizing the requirement of an adequate 
research report. Fourth, it sought to address the issue of 
insufficient knowledge of legislative techniques by seeing to the 
writing and eventual publication of a text on drafting in Chinese. 
Finally, somewhat belatedly, it sought to remedy deficiencies in 
drafters' behavioral science research skills. It did all this 
using a pedagogical method that stressed 11 learning by doing 11 • 
Every drafter engaged in the project had an assignment in 
connection with drafting one of the 22 priority laws. That 
requirement's success as a pedagogical tool for teaching the 
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drafters (not to speak of accomplishing the drafting of the 22 
priority bills) constituted an important project lesson. 
The annual tripartite evaluation sessions in Beijing concluded 
the UNDP /BLA project had successfully broken the legislative 
drafting log jam. By the end of 1994, five of the priority bills 
had been enacted, and six had been submitted for enactment. With 
one exception, all the rest seemed well on their way towards 
completion. 152 The 1994 tripartite review agreed in principle 
that, based on the project's legislative theory, drafting 
techniques and pedagogical methods, the BLA should establish a 
Center for Implementation Research and Training in Legislative 
Drafting. 
IV. LEARNING FROM THE PROJECT 
The project's learning process proved a two-way street. Not 
only the drafters, but the foreign consultants especially 
ourselves as CTAs learned many lessons about law and social 
change in the developing world. Some we have already discussed, 
for example, the pedagogical utility of requiring trainee drafters 
to learn by writing and critiquing not an hypothetical, but a real 
bill, or the sorts of social science a drafter needs to know. Some 
concern the substance of the laws on which the drafters worked. 
152 The exception -- a bill to foster groups of enterprises 
in the belief that high degrees of concentration would promote 
more vigorous industrialization came aground precisely 
because of the research accomplished by the trainers in foreign 
law and experience. As a result of that research, the 
authorities in charge of the bill laid it on a back burner. It 
seems doubtful that they will revive it, at least as originally 
conceived. 
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Here we discuss mainly the project's lessons for legislative 
drafting and the uses of law as an instrument for social 
engineering in conditions of radical social transformation. 
Like every social intervention, the project generated data to 
test the hypotheses that underpinned it. The ultimate test of the 
project will come only after evaluation of the laws that emerge 
from drafts writ ten in the course of the project, and of the 
competence of the drafters and drafting system the project's 
learning process produces. It may take years before all that 
information comes in. 
In the interim, a surrogate indicator consists of the Chinese 
drafters' and drafting authorities' acceptance of the underlying 
legislative theory. BLA has institutionalized it in their draft 
legislative drafting regulations, which include the requirement of 
a structured research report. At a 1993 meeting on China's 
evolving legal structure, not only the Director of BLA, but even 
the Prime Minister, Li Peng, spoke in terms consonant with that 
theory as a guide to social engineering through law. At a meeting 
in July, 1994, the Secretary General of the State Council indicated 
the State Council's continuing support for the project and for its 
extension. BLA, together with the Ministry of Labor, have added to 
the project the three bills earlier mentioned. 153 It will add an 
additional five to ten bills for 1995; if funding can be found, BLA 
plans to add still more. Perhaps most important, BLA plans to 
start a Center for Legislative Drafting Research and Training. As 
153 See footnote xx. 
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its name implies, in addition to training drafters 1n general, it 
will particularly focus on the research required to ensure the 
law's effective implementation. 
The people directly involved -- the drafters and especially the 
trainers seem to have seized upon the project's foundtional 
theory with real enthusiasm. Some of their ministries have 
employed the returned trainers to teach their personnel, some in 
workshops far removed from Beijing. A number of the foreign 
consultants and the supervising professors at BU have also reacted 
favorably to that theory. 
Here, in no particular order, we sketch some of the lessons the 
project seems to suggest the effective employment of law for 
transformation andde development. 
A. THE NEXUS BETWEEN LAW, BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 
The project reaffirmed the institutionalist thesis that 
institutions constitute society's building blocks and that the 
legal order comprises a polity's principal manipulable variable in 
creating and changing them. 154 The Chinese prioritized the laws 
that experience taught them their Reforms required. Resonating 
with neo-classical economics, and following suyggestions by Max 
Weber, some academic lawyers -- mainly in the US -- hold that the 
critical laws for a market economy include those that an earlier 
generation called 'private' law155 -- contract, property, and tort 
154 See pp. xx 
Veblen .... ; [ohter?] 
above; cf. John R. Commns .... ; Thorstein 
155 But see .... Cohen [on contract as a form of public law]. 
in all their elaborate variations 
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enforced principally by 
private litigation in the ordinary law courts. 
Weber was wrong. To create a socialist market economy, the 
Chinese drafting program identified almost none of these private 
laws as high priorities. Instead, their proposed priority laws 
focused mainly on the organization and processes of the 
institutions without which a market economy functions perversely: 
To ensure appropriate controls over the money supply and credit, 
the banks; to ensure government fiscal respnsibility, the processes 
of budget formation and budget discipline; to ensure an educated 
workforce, the educational system; to ensure a mobile work force, 
old age and disability pensions not tied to the workplace (as in 
China in 1994 most social insurance still was) ; to ensure a 
progressive agricultural sector, the agricultural extension 
service; to protect the environment against the ravages of private 
greed, a whole set of environmental laws; and a host of others. 
That the Chinese identified these as their priority laws suggests 
that their experience confirmed the institutionalist propostion 
that markets do not operate in vacuo, but in the context of myriad 
institutions governmental, private and in between. Their 
experience surely carries what lawyers call persuasive authority in 
support of the institutionalist thesis. If that thesis holds, then 
institutions do not constitute a 'black box', but the very core of 
economic analysis and economic and legal policy-making. Law-making 
and drafting must meet that thesis's implicit challenge : How to 
employ the legal order to build appropriate institutions. That 
requires a theory of legislation. 
B. THE POSSIBILITY OF GROUNDING LEGISLATION IN 
REASON INFORMED BY EXPERIENCE 
The project rested upon an explanation for the 
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felt 
insufficiencies of Chinese drafting: That its drafters had no 
theory to guide guide them in developing legislative programs based 
on reason informed by experience. In the positivist tradition, 
some contest the possibility of such a theory. The Chinese project 
supports the contrary claim. 
Potentially, that possibility has wide-ranging consequences. If 
it holds, it refutes analytical positivism That jurisprudential 
philosophy holds that law's formal legitimacy depends only on the 
will of the law-maker (and not on God, reason or the facts) . From 
that unexceptional proposition, and the more contentious one that 
facts and values abide in discontinuous worlds, analytical 
positivism infers that the only possible justification for a law 
consists in the law-maker' will. That mistaken notion nourishes an 
ends-means methodology and a set of categories that neglects the 
requirements of implementation. At the end of that road lie laws 
that constitute mere normative visions, too often supported by 
increasingly draconian criminal penalties. 
The UNDP/BLA project demonstrated the possibility of a more 
fruitful way of using law in the development enterprise. An 
adequate legislative theory must guide drafters in formulating laws 
that not merely describe desired end results, but will actually 
engender the necessary changedf behaviors. Rather than ignoring 
implementation problems, competent drafting must take account and 
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deal with them. 
The formulation of an adequate legislative theory has 
consequences for comparative law. 
C. THE USES OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN LAW-MAKING 
The world around, drafters copy foreign law, usually pretty 
blindly. As a drowning person in desparation grabs a life-ring, so 
an harassed drafter, 
program and to write 
scrambling as usual to devise a legislative 
it into precise and if possible elegant 
language before next Monday, too often grabs a close enough foreign 
law. 
The project's legislative theory underscores the argument that 
copying foreign law works at best by accident and that rarely. 
(Call that "the law of non-transferability of law. "15 6 ) That does 
not imply that foreign law and experience do not deserve the 
closest study. The world around, policy makers' efforts to use law 
to resolve social problems have contributed to the accumulation of 
an extensive body of experience, a rich body of ore from which 
Chinese (as well as others) may mine hypotheses relevant to each of 
problem-solving's four steps. The project's theory girded Chinese 
drafters to search foreign experience for difficulties which, 
though not yet apparent in China, might yet arise, and for which, 
therefore, their draft would do well to provide. For example, if 
in other countries private schools helped engender the emergence of 
a ruling class, in drafting its new education law surely the 
drafters should consider that possible consequence. The theory 
156 See Seidman and Seidman ... . 
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also guided them to explore foreign law and experience for possible 
hypotheses to explain problematic behaviors. Although every 
countryts circumstances remain unique 1 an explanation for foreign 
behaviors analogous to those that the proposed Chinese law will 
address may find a warrant also in China. Insider trading/ for 
example/ has arisen in almost every country 1 s security markets. 
China 1 s drafters learned much by reviewing the investigations that 
those country 1 s researchers had made over the years/ both in terms 
of probable causes 1 and research techniques for capturing the 
required data. Obviously/ foreign law and experience can offer 
ideas about solutions 1 too 1 that elsewhere address the causes 
similar to those in China 1 and provide some evidence as to possible 
social costs and benefits. Finally 1 the theory urges that 
drafters study foreign law for inspiration concerning alternative 
ways of monitoring the implementation of the law I to provide a 
trip-wire of feedback to the law-makers. Above all/ that theory 
taught that Chinese drafters can learn literally nothing from the 
black-letter texts of foreign law; they could only learn from 
studying the law and its social consequences. 
D. LEGISLATIVE TECHNIQUES 
The project experience also reinforced several practical 
propositions about drafting bills of the broad scope initially 
envisaged for China/s 22 priority laws. 
of these: The dangers of 1 stuffing/ 
advantages of intransitive legislation. 
Here we discuss only two 
bills and the potential 
1 . 'Stuffing' bills. At the 1992 workshop/ foreign consultants 
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observed that some of the proposed bills seemed great grab-bags 
containing subject-matters only tenuously held together by a common 
thread. For example, the first draft of the Chinese banking bill 
included not only provisions creating and defining the central, 
commercial, development and agricultural banks, but also provisions 
ordaining the establishment and operations of stock exchanges and 
insurance companies. This multiplied the numbers of disputable 
issues that before the bill's enactment the drafters, and 
ultimately the law-makers had to resolve. As elsewhere, supporters 
of one provision of China's draft bills often jibbed at other 
provisions. 
entire bill; 
It proved an unending task to win a consensus for an 
the debates had already persisted for years. Not 
surprisingly this constituted a major reason for China's inordinate 
delays in enacting priority legislation. Drafting separate bills 
for the central bank, and subsequently for the other banks, stock 
exchanges and insurance companies facilitated the necessary 
research and reaching agreement on the complex issues each bill 
involved. 
2. Intransitive legislation. Repeatedly, the project 
participants found themselves grappling with priority legislation 
that proposed to resolve extremely broad and intransigeant issues: 
revamping the entire budget system; restructuring the educational 
program from kindergarten through university; or even the somewhat 
'simpler' questions of establishing a national agricultural 
technology extension education agency or a national parks system 
all in an increasingly decentralized political system that had to 
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meet the diverse claims and demands of well-nigh a quarter of the 
human race. The task of conducting the necessary research seemed 
overwhelming. Confronting conditions as different as the bustling 
urban commercial centers of Guanzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing, the 
desert wastes of the old silk route across Xinjiang and the remote 
mountain vastnesses of Tibet, law-makers understandably hesitated 
to enact detailed laws. In addition to these cultural and 
geographical discontinuities, China's rapidly-changing economy made 
it impossible for bills to prescribe the details of expected future 
behaviors. Those issues will remain with China long after it 
enacts bills addressing them. Dtrafters had to write, not bills 
that for a reasonable period of time might settle the issues 
involved, but bills creating institutions capable of continuously 
dealing with those issues in their constantly changing aspects. 
That called for the increased use of intransitive law, a trend 
already well marked elsewhere. 157 An intransitive law endows an 
appropriate governmental agency with broad powers (preferably 
bounded by stated criteria and procedures) to promulgate subsidiary 
regulations that will take account of regional and temporal 
variations. 
For example, no single law could adequately prescribe the 
detailed behaviors of the million or more agricultural technology 
extension agents required to assist China's 200-odd million small 
farmers increase productivity in their widely-differing climatic, 
geographic, and provincial government circumstances. Instead, the 
157 Colin Diver (Yale) ; Edward Rubin (Columbia) 
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Chinese drafted a bill that delineated the criteria and procedures 
by which the Ministry of Agriculture would consult with the 
extension agency, provincial and local governments, and the 
farmers. Drawing on the results of that participatory process 
ministerial drafters could then formulate appropriate subsidiary 
regulations adapted to specific locales and time period. To 
ensure timely revision as circumstances change, the bill also 
prescribes ways by which the ministry should involve the relevant 
actors in monitoring and evaluating the regulation's 
implementation. 158 
Seemingly by-passing democratically-elected legislatures, in most 
of the world administrative law-making has a bad name. Because 
legislatures cannot readily adapt rules to local circumstance and 
the changes that time erodes in them, however, no alternative lies 
at hand. The problem becomes one of ensuring that administrative 
law-making becomes transparent, accountable and participatory1 59 -
- a matter for an adequate Administrative Procedures Act. The 
advantages of devoting bills to but a single topic, and, where 
appropriate, drafting intransitive bills constituted two important 
lessons of the project. 
E. LAW AND THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
Commentators have frequently remarked upon the differences 
between China's remarkable economic successes and Eastern Europe's 
equally remarkable failures in making a transformation from 
158 That bill, too , has been enacted . 
159 
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centrally planned to more or less 'market' economies. In these 
accounts, Eastern Europe attempted to move from one to the other in 
a "big bang", that is, by relaxing all state controls at once, 
trusting to market forces to forge new institutions de novo. By 
contrast, China moved incrementally, in principle creating new 
institutions deliberately, step by step as needed, to implement an 
on-going transformation process. 1 60 
The project's legislative theory suggests an explanation for 
these quite different experiences. The 'big bang' strategy seems 
to stem from neoclassical economic's explicit premise that the 
market works basically the same way everywhere, and that 
institutions constitute a 'black box'without significance for 
analysis. 1 61 In principle, therefore, to legislate for a big bang 
transformation does not require careful examination of specific 
country circumstances or specific country institutions. The same 
laws can work in any market economy. A country seeking to 
transform itself into a market economy need only drop all laws 
regulating economic affairs and enact laws that track those of some 
other, successful market economy. 
The legislative theory that underpins the UNDP / BLA project denies 
that strategy. The law of non-transferability of law1 62 holds 
that, save accidentally, a country cannot successfully copy law. 
1 6
° Cf. Shahid Yusey, "China's Moacroeconomic Performance and 
Management during Transition", 8 J. Ec. Perspectives 71 (1994). 
1 6 1 Samuelson 
1 62 Supra, text at n. 
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All institutions i.e., the repetitive patterns of behavior 
emerge historically in country-specific circumstances as various 
actors respond, not only to the law's commands, but also to the 
constraints and resources in their unique environments. The most 
important element in those environments consists of other 
institutions, the repetitive patterns of behaviors of other social 
actors. 
Like neoclassical economic theory, law and economics teaches that 
if everyone pursues their own interests, mirabile dictu there will 
emerge the optimal social allocation of goods and resources. If 
the existing country-specific environment makes it in each actor's 
interest to make socially perverse choices, that optimistic outcome 
seems unlikely. 163 Simply to eliminate the institutional 
structures of a planned economy cannot automatically ensure the 
relevant economic actors will chose to behave in ways likely to 
produce the goods promised by neoclassical economics. Indeed, 
contemporary history suggests that, instead of choosing to behave 
in economically productive and socially useful ways, many newly-
rich millionaires in the formerly socialist states of Europe have 
reaped huge profits at the expense of a drastic drop in the 
majority's living standards. 
163 Even in neoclassical economics, that does not always hold, 
as the classical cases of the tragedy of the commons and the 
Prisoner's Dilemma suggest. (If everyone, pursuing their self-
interest, pastures as many beasts as they choose on a village 
common, they will inevitably degrade the common grazing ground. In 
the case of a planned prison uprising, each prisoner's interest 
lies in secret betrayal thus making almost inevitable the 
uprising's failure.) 
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That only underscores the reality on which an institutionalist 
legislative theory rests: the economy, like all of society, 
consists of a complex web of institutions, each interlocked with 
the others. The successful accomplishment of one institution's 
tasks constitutes the necessary condition for another's. (If the 
steel mill does not supply steel, the automaker closes down) Law-
makers cannot simply abolish all the existing rules that define 
these interrelated institutional behaviors, and expect that new and 
better behaviors will automatically appear. Unless, in a period of 
transition, law-makers carefully study how to keep integrated 
social and political institutions, they court economic and social 
disaster. If the legislative theory that underpins the UNDP/BLA 
project holds, the big bang theory of social change cannot stand. 
F. LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
While the issues of the Rule of Law and democracy remain far too 
large to consider adequately here, it seems worth considering two 
aspects of their relationship to the UNDP/BLA legislative drafting 
project: Why China undertook its legislative initiative at this 
time, and whether its implications for the Rule of Law in China. 
First, Max Weber offered two propositions that may help to 
explain why the Chinese initiatives towards establishing a legal 
order emerged at this time in Chinese history. He held that, to 
create a framework of predictability of state action, market actors 
require adherence to law and 'legal-rational thought.' Further, he 
suggested that all revolutionary regimes achieve their initial 
legitimacy because of the charisma of a great leader -- George 
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Washington, Lenin, Ghandi . Charisma has no real content; 
literally, it means a gift of God. Weber used the term to mean 
that indefinable something that great leader s have. With the death 
of the great leader, the successor rulers almost invariably search 
for legal-rational legitimacy. Legal-rational legitimacy implies 
the rule of law. China's search for a rational legal framework for 
government fits both Weber's proposit i ons . 
Second, what implications might the UNDP/BLA project have for the 
democratic project in China? Some argue that law used 
instrumentally inevitably becomes a mere tool in service of 
authoritarianism . 1 64 In the UNDP /BLA project, China used law as 
an instrument of policy on a grand scale. Did that lead inevitably 
to authoritarian practices? Or did the fact that it used law 
instrumentally in the particular way that it did tend to favor, not 
authoritarianism, but its opposite? We believe that the project 
tended towards empowering the disinherited , and to that extent, 
favored the democratic project, both procedurally and 
substantively. 
Procedurally, the project rested on a legislative theory that 
underscores democratic participation in all aspects of the law-
making, implementing and evaluation process. Outside of a few rare 
specimens of countries, despite our myths, popular participation in 
the law-making process does not take place even where a 
164 
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democratically-elected legislature exists. 1 65 Until a bill comes 
before the legislature for its vote, law-making usually takes place 
under a cloak of deepest secrecy. That cloak covers the entire 
law-making process: from the monitoring of existing law, through 
the spark of an idea for new legislation, through drafting, through 
presentation to and vote in Cabinet, all the way to the draft's 
presentation to the legislature as a Government bill. Without 
participation in that lengthy bill-formulating process, however, 
for democratic law-making popular elections serve a symbolic, not 
an instrumental function. 
Better than some other, nominally democratic countries, China 
ventilates the bill-creating process. At its discretion, BLA 
publishes some bills, asking public comment, before consideration 
by the State Council. The pending regulations on legislative 
drafting will define the criteria as to whom BLA and the DLAs must 
give notice of a pending bill, asking for comment. In the UNDP/BLA 
project, China's drafters wrestled with other issues of 
165 China does not have competitive party electionsi if that 
constitutes the touchstone of democracy, it has none. Its national 
legislature, the National People's Congress, rarely divides over a 
proposed law. The State Council -- that is, what in the British 
system would constitute the cabinet -- seldom debates issues in 
public. In most nominally democratic states, however, by and large 
from the legislature the government gets what government wants. 
(With elected represenatives responsible primarily to their home 
communities and precious little party discipline, the United States 
stands as a striking exception) . In a Parliamentary system, in 
which the majority in Parliament elects Cabinet, of course 
Parliament remains subservient to Government. To challenge a 
Government bill requires back-benchers willing to risk their 
political future . See generally R.Kent Weaner and Bert A. Rockman, 
eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the 
United States and Abroad. (Washington: Brookings, 1992) 12 et 
.§.Sill....:_ 
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participation, not only in the bill creating, but also the bill 
implementation and monitoring process. In drafting research 
reports and bills dealing with particular areas, ranging from 
managing national parks and agricultural technology extension 
education, to budget-making and coordinated planning, they 
diligently explored foreign law and experience for additional 
measures likely to ensure openness, accountability and, where 
possible, various forms of community participation. 
The project's legislative theory implicitly fostered greater 
participation, for three reasons: 
(1) The theory requires research to discover the scope of the 
difficulty and to generate and provide evidence for hypotheses 
explaining role occupants' behaviours. In that enterprise, the 
role occupants both the primary actors and those in the 
existing implementing agencies constitute the greatest 
reservoir of knowledge about their own behaviors and the 
constraints and resources of their own environments. Engaging 
their participation in the research not only satisfies an ideal 
of participation, but serves to ensure essential inputs. 
( 2) Participation in the research empowers those affected to 
help solve their own problems. They come to understand better the 
nature and causes of the difficulties they confront, thus 
acquiring the capacity to participate effectively in finding 
solutions. 166 Studies1 67 suggest, furthermore, that 
participation in this kind of process tends to sensitize 
implementing agents to the their 'clients'' difficulties, as well 
as stimulating them to improve their own work in helping to solve 
them. 
(3) If democracy really means one person, one vote, then one's 
influence ought to depend not on power but the worth of one's 
arguments and data. The requirement that the justification of 
1 66 The PRA methodology operates on this principle by 
engaging local communities in assessing their own resource use; the 
methodology here proposed extends that process to examination and 
improvement of the institutions that shape resource allocation 
patterns. 
1 67 Cf Klitgaard 
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a proposed bill rest, not on power but on reason informed by 
experience holds the possibility that anyone, regardless of 
status, can challenge a bill in terms of reason and evidence. 
Only if that latter proposition holds can participation 
genuinely and not merely symbolically empower the powerless. 
These propositions, of course, fundamentally contradict 
approaches that teach that decisions about what the law ought to 
be depends solely or even mainly upon the 'values and attitudes,' 
the interests or the ideologies of the decision-makers -- in fine, 
not on the persuasive power of their justifications, but their 
power to impose their solutions. Those approaches ineluctably make 
relevant only inputs from those whose power the decision-makers 
respect, not arguments based on data or reason. It does no good 
for people, either directly or through representatives, to 
participate in the input and feedback processes if those who staff 
the conversion processes adhere to a theory that instructs them not 
to listen. 
In contrast, a legislative theory that holds that competent 
policy decisions must rest on reason informed by experience 
requires opening the door to meaningful participation by anybody 
with new data (i.e., experience) or a new way of reasoning about 
that data. Such a theory opens the way for the politically 
powerless to challenge authority. A legislative theory that rests 
on reason and experience becomes a sine qua non for a democratic 
law-making process. 
Substantively, the project paid special at tent ion to the poor and 
powerless. The project document (technically a conjtract between 
UNDP and the Chinese Centre for Economic and Technical Interchanges 
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(the Chinese government agency for dealing with foreign aid 
agencies) fell under UNDP guidelines that required special 
attention to issues involving women, children, the poor, minorities 
and the environment. That document therefore stipulated that each 
bill drafted in the project specifically note the estimated impact 
of the bill on these too-often overlooked interests. That 
requirement will likely also have the force of law when included in 
China's new legislative drafting regulations. To the extent that 
democracy concerns enhancing the position and power of the 
majority, like the process issues first mentioned, that requirement 
must count as tending to further the democratic project. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The UNDP/BLA project used the occasion of drafting 22 priority 
economic laws to strengthen China's legislative drafting capacity. 
For that purpose, it brought together over 150 drafters, including 
44 trainers, with carefully-selected foreign consultants, in a 
five-year learning process. Working together, they learned to use 
and deepen legislative theory as a guide to learning from foreign 
law and experience and analyzing the causes of, and proposing 
legislative measures to overcome, the social behaviors that 
threatened to block China's Reforms and Open Policy. 
The theory put forward in this paper and that underpinned the 
UNDP/BLA project teaches that we hold all knowledge contingently, 
subject to refutation at any instant by better reason or the 
experiences of the morrow. In effect, all knowledge consist of 
hypotheses, educated guesses, born of fallible reason informed by 
incomplete experience. 
to make policy and 
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Nevertheless, governments have no exit but 
legislation on that ineluctably infirm 
foundation. Many other countries presently pursue transformations 
analogous to the Chinese ones; the movement towards market-like 
systems seems ubiquitous. Do their experiences confirm or refut 
the lessons we draw from our experiences in China? The project 
experience provided evidence for a variety of propositions, some 
more technical, others of a broader philosophical nature: 
( 1) Pedagogically, one cannot teach drafting except in the 
context of learning-by-doing, that is, actually drafting bills. 
(2) Drafters need specialized skills in social science research, 
mainly as educated consumers of social science findings, 
particularly with respect, not to quantitative data, but 
qualitative evidence relating to social behavior trends. 
( 3) Drafting law in conditions of social change requires 
relatively narrow bills, often granting implementing agencies 
powers, within the framework of carefully designed criteria and 
procedures, to formulate implementating regulations. 
(4) Institutions constitute society's building blocks, and the 
legal order comprises government's primary tool for creating and 
changing them. 
(5) The UNDP/BLA project's underlying legislative theory opens 
the possibility for drafting legislation based not merely on the 
dictates of power, but reason informed by experience, an essential 
premise for democratic participatory law-making processes. 
(6) Drafters cannot copy foreign law and experience, but they 
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can utilize its teachings at every stage of the problem-solving 
methodology. 
(7) The project's legislative theory suggests the 'big bang' 
transformation strategy cannot succeed because it assumes away the 
problems of restructuring the complex web of institutions that 
comprise any society's unique social structure. 
(8) The project's requirement that drafters explicitl;y assess 
the impact of the bill on women, children, the poor, minorities and 
the environment can only serve to further the democratic project. 
